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ASSORTED ANTI-LEEGIN CANARDS:
WHY RESISTANCE IS MISGUIDED AND FUTILE
ALAN J. MEESE
ABSTRACT
In Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007), the Supreme Court reversed Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911), which had banned minimum resale price maintenance (“minimum RPM”) as unlawful per se. For many, Leegin was a straightforward exercise of the Court’s long-recognized
authority, implied by the Sherman Act’s rule of reason, to adjust antitrust doctrine in light
of new economic learning. In particular, Leegin invoked the teachings of transaction cost
economics (“TCE”), which holds that many non-standard agreements, including minimum
RPM, are voluntary mechanisms that reduce the transaction costs that manufacturers incur
when they rely upon independent dealers to distribute their goods. For instance, proponents
of TCE, including Nobel Laureate Oliver Williamson, have asserted that minimum RPM
can prevent free riding and ensure that dealers engage in an optimal amount and type of
promotion. Invoking these and other possible benefits, the Leegin Court ruled that minimum RPM could produce “redeeming virtues” and thus did not satisfy the normal test for
per se condemnation. In so doing, the Court adhered to the rule of reason’s requirement, articulated in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), that courts adjust antitrust doctrine when “more accurate economic conceptions” undermine previous decisions.
However, some have chosen to resist Leegin to the utmost. In particular, scholars, enforcement officials, and forty-one state attorneys general have sought to convince Congress
and/or state legislatures to reinstate the per se rule by statute, for instance, and have contended that minimum RPM is unlawful per se under existing state antitrust laws. Many
have also argued that, pending Leegin’s reversal, courts should subject minimum RPM to a
“quick look” rule of reason, whereby the practice is presumed unlawful, immediately casting
upon the defendant a burden of justification. Perhaps because of these efforts, legislation
that would have reversed Leegin and codified Dr. Miles was proposed by Congress in 2011.
There is, of course, a long history of Congress overriding straightforward applications of
the Sherman Act, sometimes at the behest of special interest groups that benefit from such
exemptions. However, those who resist Leegin and seek to reinstate the per se rule against
minimum RPM do not rely upon the power of legislatures to pass wealth-reducing legislation. Instead they argue that Leegin “got it wrong” when applying basic antitrust principles
animating the rule of reason. For these advocates, then, a new per se ban on minimum RPM
would merely undo Leegin’s mistake.
This article refutes the various arguments that Leegin’s detractors have made for reinstating Dr. Miles and/or “quick look” treatment. TCE, it is shown, undermined the central
premise of the per se rule, namely, that minimum RPM is economically indistinguishable
from a naked horizontal cartel between dealers. This realization casts upon those who resist
Leegin a burden of articulating and supporting an alternative rationale for per se condemnation. As the Article shows, Leegin’s detractors have not met this burden. Instead, their
various arguments contradict TCE, basic antitrust principles, or both. Taken to their logical
conclusion, these arguments would require the Court to abandon decades of jurisprudence
based upon TCE and/or the long-standing test for per se illegality. However, Leegin’s detractors have offered no argument in favor of such radical changes.
Thus, far from correcting Leegin’s purported antitrust error, reimposition of the ban on
minimum RPM would constitute a rejection of the “more accurate economic conceptions”
that should drive antitrust doctrine and thus be akin to a welfare-reducing special interest
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exemption from the Sherman Act. Such exemptions are read narrowly, to minimize the impact of special interest influence in the legislative process. Indeed, even if Congress or the
states do codify a per se ban on minimum RPM, state and federal courts will have various
doctrinal strategies at their disposal to minimize the wealth-reducing impact of such legislation by, for instance, reading any amendment narrowly and restricting the class of plaintiffs
who can challenge such agreements. As a result, resistance to Leegin may be more than
merely misguided; it may also be futile.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 1 of the Sherman Act bans contractual restraints that are
“unreasonable” because they exercise market power and reduce economic welfare. The “rule of reason” thus requires judges to determine
whether challenged restraints confer market power or, instead, reallocate rights and obligations in a manner that creates wealth. However, most judges are insufficiently conversant with the sort of microeconomic theory necessary to evaluate the many trade restraints
potentially subject to Section 1. When implementing the rule of reason, then, generalist judges must rely upon the expertise of others,
particularly economists and economically sophisticated lawyers and
legal scholars, about the impact of various restraints upon economic
welfare. While courts sometimes undertake a “full-blown” analysis to
determine whether a challenged restraint is “unreasonable,” courts
declare certain categories of restraints “unreasonable per se.”

2013]

ASSORTED ANTI-LEEGIN CANARDS

909

It is not surprising, then, that developments in economic science
should ultimately influence antitrust doctrine. The Congress that
passed the Sherman Act anticipated that antitrust courts would
draw upon centuries of common law tradition when developing such
doctrine. That tradition, in turn, encouraged courts to revise prior
decisions when changes in “economic conceptions”—what modern
scholars and judges call “economic theory”—altered judges’ perception of the impact of such restraints. In the same way, economic theory has repeatedly informed the “reason” that judges bring to bear
when adjudicating Section 1 controversies. Thus, decisions from prior
eras often appear “wrong” to modern eyes because the jurists who
rendered them were applying theory now deemed erroneous.
The last century has provided a case study illustrating this account of the relationship between economic theory and antitrust doctrine. During this period judicial treatment of minimum resale price
maintenance (“minimum RPM”) and other vertical distributional restraints evolved substantially. In 1911, in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., the Supreme Court declared minimum
RPM unreasonable per se, that is, unlawful without regard to a contract’s actual economic effect. 1 The Court reasoned that such agreements were equivalent to naked horizontal agreements between
dealers. Shortly thereafter the Court narrowed this prohibition, announcing, for instance, that minimum RPM imposed pursuant to
consignment agreements was subject to a forgiving, full-blown rule of
reason analysis. Congress, in turn, invited states to immunize most
minimum RPM under so-called “fair trade” laws, an invitation that
most states accepted.
There matters stood until the 1950s, when courts, influenced by
neoclassical price theory and its perfect competition model, grew increasingly hostile to partial contractual integration or “non-standard
contracts,” particularly distributional restraints. This hostility manifested itself in declarations that particular restraints were unreasonable per se, both because they reduced rivalry between the parties to
them and, in addition, could not produce redeeming virtues. In so doing, the Court built upon and reaffirmed Dr. Miles. Indeed, by the
late 1960s, the Court had banned vertical territorial restraints as
well as maximum resale price maintenance, practices that had previously merited forgiving rule of reason scrutiny.
Just as the scope of antitrust regulation reached its maximum, the
field of microeconomic theory known as industrial organization experienced a scientific revolution, in the form of Transaction Cost Economics (“TCE”). TCE offered a new theory explaining why reliance on
1. See 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
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atomistic markets to conduct economic activity—transacting—might
reduce economic welfare. In particular, TCE posited that reliance on
such markets could impose costs on transacting parties, what practitioners of TCE dubbed “transaction costs.” According to TCE, economic actors could reduce such costs by forming new firms or expanding the reach of current firms through complete or partial vertical
integration. Indeed, according to Nobel Laureate Oliver Williamson,
who pioneered TCE’s advance during the 1970s, TCE established a
rebuttable presumption that complete and partial integration in the
form of non-standard contracts could reduce the cost of transacting
and thereby increase economic welfare. Like other practitioners of
TCE, Williamson examined distributional restraints, that is, agreements limiting, say, the prices charged by retail dealers or the territories in which they could operate.
TCE has had a profound influence on Section 1 doctrine, which,
after all, governs a wide universe of non-standard contracts. In 1977,
in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., the Supreme Court
reversed course, embraced TCE-based arguments, and jettisoned its
recent ban on vertical territorial restraints. 2 In particular, Sylvania
drew upon arguments, first made with respect to minimum RPM,
that reliance upon independent dealers—the market—to distribute a
product could lead to suboptimal promotional investments and thus
market failure, as some dealers might free ride on promotional investments made by others. Territorial restraints, the Court said,
could overcome this free riding, ensuring that dealers could capture
the benefits of their promotional investments and reducing a manufacturer’s cost of relying upon the market to distribute its goods. In
this way, the Court said, such restraints could further “interbrand
competition,” the primary concern of the antitrust laws.
Sylvania signaled a sea change in antitrust jurisprudence; the
Court would subsequently reverse or narrow previous decisions that
had declared particular non-standard agreements unreasonable per
se. This trend culminated in 2007, when, in Leegin, the Supreme
Court invoked TCE logic to overrule Dr. Miles and declare minimum
RPM subject to full-blown rule of reason analysis, like the vast majority of restraints subject to Section 1.3 Like Sylvania, Leegin credited arguments by numerous proponents of TCE to the effect that, by
setting minimum resale prices, manufacturers and their dealers can
overcome various market failures and resulting transaction costs
that would otherwise occur if dealers were free to charge whatever
they wished. For instance, the Court opined that minimum RPM
could ensure that dealers who invest heavily in promoting the manu2. See 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
3. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 881.
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facturer’s product can capture the sales resulting from that investment, free of rivalry from free-riding dealers that decline to engage in
promotion and thus charge cut-rate prices. Thus, the Court said, minimum RPM could facilitate entry by upstart manufacturers seeking
to attract established dealers to carry and promote new products and
also facilitate promotion of more established brands. The Court also
concluded that manufacturers could employ minimum RPM to guarantee dealers a stream of income going forward, thereby making
termination a meaningful sanction that would deter dealers from
breaching various contractual obligations, whether or not those obligations were related to promotion. Given the possibility that minimum RPM could produce such benefits, the Court said, Dr. Miles had
erred in equating manufacturer-induced minimum RPM with naked
agreements between dealers, with the result that per se condemnation was inappropriate. Although recognizing that Dr. Miles was a
longstanding precedent, the Court invoked numerous prior decisions
that had revised or abandoned rulings whose factual premises had
proven false.
Leegin’s straightforward application of TCE should not have been
controversial. After all, the Court had repeatedly reiterated Sylvania’s transaction cost logic, sometimes in unanimous or near unanimous decisions. Indeed, both proponents and detractors of Sylvania
recognized at the time that the decision’s logic would also undermine
the per se ban on minimum RPM. Nonetheless, various scholars, political actors, and enforcement officials have rejected Leegin, taking
various steps to resist it. For instance, some members of Congress introduced legislation to reverse Leegin, thereby codifying Dr. Miles by
statute, a result endorsed by more than forty state attorneys general.
At least one state has passed post-Leegin legislation banning minimum RPM within its borders, and attorneys general and private
plaintiffs in several states have attacked minimum RPM under state
antitrust laws, often with success. Finally, some scholars have argued that lower courts applying Leegin should subject minimum
RPM to a “quick look” rule of reason, presuming all such restraints
unlawful unless the defendant meets a heavy burden of establishing
that the restraint produces significant benefits.
Of course, Congress and the states are perfectly free to ignore economic theory and ban conduct that is “reasonable” within the meaning of the Sherman Act. Thus, Congress has often overridden
straightforward applications of the Sherman Act, either to exempt
otherwise lawful conduct or to ban reasonable, wealth-creating conduct, sometimes at the behest of special interest groups that have
lobbied for such exceptions. However, opponents of Leegin purport to
embrace decisions such as Sylvania and disclaim reliance on any
power to pass wealth-destroying legislation. Instead, these advocates
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uniformly assert that minimum RPM almost always reduces welfare,
thus purporting to rebut the Williamsonian presumption described
above. Indeed, following the lead of these advocates, proposed federal
legislation was premised upon findings that Leegin was an incorrect
exposition of the Sherman Act. In so doing, these scholars and public
officials reject the work of leading practitioners of TCE, including
those who first offered transaction cost rationales for non-standard
agreements, particularly minimum RPM, during the 1960s. In other
words, these opponents of Leegin, while purporting to embrace TCE’s
conclusions in other contexts, attack one of TCE’s foundational exemplars by claiming that minimum RPM rarely, if ever, overcomes a
failure in the distribution market.
This Article defends Leegin against its various detractors. In particular, the Article identifies and debunks several arguments that
those who resist the decision have deployed in favor of reinstating
Dr. Miles, whether by federal statute, state legislation, or judicial interpretation of state antitrust law. As Leegin explained, there is a
strong presumption in favor of full-blown rule of reason analysis of
restraints challenged under Section 1; any departure from this
standard must rest upon a concrete demonstration that a particular
category of restraint is “always or almost always” unreasonable. TCE
undermined Dr. Miles’s purely theoretical assumption that minimum
RPM is the economic equivalent of a naked cartel between dealers,
thereby casting upon modern proponents of per se condemnation a
burden of providing and supporting a substitute rationale for such
automatic illegality. None of these arguments, it is shown, comes
close to carrying this burden or otherwise justifies a reversal of Leegin, legislative or otherwise. Ironically, Dr. Miles itself has deprived
its supporters of a factual record that might bolster their case, by
preventing the sort of full-blown rule of reason analysis that could
help shed light on the actual economic effects of the practice. Nor
have Leegin’s detractors established the ordinary prerequisites for
application of the “quick look” rule of reason to minimum RPM.
Indeed, the various objections to Leegin are objections to TCE,
fundamental principles of antitrust jurisprudence, or both. Put another way, arguments for displacing Leegin would, if taken to their
logical conclusion, require courts also to overrule numerous other decisions that reflect the economic learning of the TCE revolution. The
result would be a body of antitrust law divorced from the very economic theory that Congress expected courts to apply when fashioning
antitrust doctrine. Far from correcting any purported error, reversal
of Leegin by statute or otherwise would create another exemption
from the Sherman Act under the guise of enhancing competition, a
result analogous to the anti-competitive Robinson-Patman Act. At
the same time, it seems unlikely that reimposition of a per se ban on
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minimum RPM would induce the Supreme Court to abandon decisions such as Sylvania and its progeny. The result would therefore be
an arbitrary distinction between price and non-price restraints,
thereby causing parties to elect non-price restraints for reasons unrelated to wealth creation. It thus seems likely that federal courts and
the federal enforcement agencies, who read exemptions from the antitrust laws narrowly, will adopt various strategies that minimize the
impact of any legislative response to Leegin. Thus, resistance to Leegin is not merely misguided as a matter of antitrust principle but is
likely futile, as well.
Part II of this Article describes the normative, jurisprudential,
and economic foundations of Section 1’s rule of reason. Part III recounts Dr. Miles’s per se ban on minimum RPM, which the Court
equated with a horizontal dealer cartel. Part IV details the Court’s
own effort to narrow Dr. Miles, as well as Congressional authorization of so-called “fair trade” legislation, pursuant to which most
states authorized minimum RPM for nearly four decades. Part V describes how neoclassical price theory gave rise to antitrust’s inhospitality tradition, which manifested itself in judicial hostility to minimum RPM and other non-standard agreements, including non-price
vertical restraints. Part VI recounts the transaction cost revolution,
which offered beneficial explanations for non-standard agreements,
including minimum RPM. Part VII details the Supreme Court’s embrace of TCE, first in Sylvania and its progeny and then in Leegin.
Part VIII describes the resistance to Leegin and resulting proposals
to reverse and/or undermine the decision. Part IX recounts and refutes various arguments made by Leegin’s detractors, showing that
such arguments reject TCE, basic antitrust principles, or both. Part
X offers some concluding observations, including various strategies
that courts and the enforcement agencies might employ to minimize
the anti-reason impact of legislation reimposing the per se rule.
II. SECTION 1’S RULE OF REASON: APPLYING “ACCURATE
ECONOMIC CONCEPTIONS”
Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids “contract[s], combination[s,
and] . . . conspirac[ies] in restraint of trade.” 4 Taken literally, however, a ban on all agreements that “restrain trade” would grind the
economy to a halt. 5 In the beginning, then, the Supreme Court tempered the Sherman Act’s “plain language” to avoid these wealth-

4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
5. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (“[R]ead
literally, § 1 would outlaw the entire body of private contract law. Yet it is that body of law
that establishes the enforceability of commercial agreements and enables competitive markets—indeed, a competitive economy—to function effectively.”).
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destroying effects, holding that only direct restraints violate the Act. 6
Such restraints, the Court held, included horizontal agreements between firms that had received special benefits from the State7 and
purely private cartels that produced prices above the competitive level. 8 By contrast, “indirect” restraints included contracts that were incidental to some main, lawful purpose, such as covenants ancillary to
the formation of a partnership or ancillary to the sale of a business.9
Congress, the Court said, did not mean to ban such minor restraints,
even if they had a remote effect on price. 10 Circuit Judge (and future
Chief Justice) William Howard Taft, in his influential Addyston Pipe
decision, sketched a similar distinction between “ancillary” restraints, which were lawful absent some showing of harm, and “naked” restraints, which were automatically unlawful.11
In the landmark Standard Oil decision, the Supreme Court confirmed what had been implicit in prior decisions, namely, that Section 1 only bans “unreasonable” restraints. 12 In so doing, the Court
emphasized the common law origins of the term “restraint of trade”
and that a broader construction of the Act would interfere with
wealth-creating commerce, not to mention liberty of contract. 13 Not
all agreements reducing competition were unreasonable, the Court
said. Instead, an agreement was unreasonable if it restrained competition “unduly,” by producing monopoly or its consequences—higher

6. See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 566-68 (1898) (Sherman Act
bans only direct restraints of interstate commerce, leaving “indirect” restraints, including
“ordinary contracts and combinations” unscathed); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578,
591-92 (1898) (same).
7. See Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 568-73 (holding that horizontal price fixing by interstate railroads was a “direct restraint” contrary to Section 1 because railroads had received
special benefits from the state).
8. See generally Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)
(condemning private cartel agreement that produces unreasonably high prices as a direct
restraint).
9. See Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 567-70 (elaborating on the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” restraints); Hopkins, 171 U.S. at 591-92 (same); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280-84 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d as modified by 175 U.S. 211
(1899).
10. See Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 567-68; Hopkins, 171 U.S. at 591-92.
11. See 85 F. 271. See also ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTIRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT
WAR WITH ITSELF 26 (1993) (calling Taft’s Addyston Pipe opinion “one of the greatest”).
12. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See also United States v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) (approving Standard Oil and extending the rule of
reason to Section 2 of the Sherman Act).
13. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 63 (stating that a literal application of the Act
“would be destructive of all right to contract or agree or combine in any respect whatever
as to subjects embraced in interstate trade or commerce”); American Tobacco, 221 U.S. at
179-80 (Standard Oil held that the term “restraint of trade should be given a meaning
which would not destroy the individual right to contract and render difficult if not impossible any movement of trade in the channels of interstate commerce—the free movement of
which it was the purpose of the statute to protect.”). See also Alan J. Meese, Standard Oil
as Lochner’s Trojan Horse, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 783, 784 (2012).
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prices, reduced output, and/or deteriorating quality—and thus had
the same impact as a “direct” restraint.14 Moreover, the Court suggested that some contracts were unreasonable on their face, because
of their “nature or character,” and could thus be condemned without
examination of their actual consequences.15 The Court also endorsed
a flexible approach to the meaning of “restraint of trade,” discussing
with approval common law decisions that had refashioned doctrine in
light of “more accurate economic conceptions.”16 In the end, the Court
said, the rule of reason required judges to employ “the light of reason” to determine whether a challenged agreement offended “the
public policy embodied in the statute,” a process that, while applying
a fixed normative standard, could produce different doctrinal results
as economic conceptions evolved over time. 17 It is thus no surprise
that antitrust doctrine has always reflected the influence of prevailing economic theory. 18
III. DR. MILES BANS MINIMUM RPM:
CONGRESS AND THE STATES RESIST
Just six weeks before Standard Oil, the Court applied the direct/indirect test to vertical restraints for the first time, in Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.19 There, Dr. Miles sought to
control resale prices by dealers distributing its products in two different ways. First, the firm entered into consignment agreements with
wholesalers. These agreements provided that consignees could only
sell to firms designated by Dr. Miles and set a floor on such prices.20
Second, Dr. Miles appointed several thousand retailers authorized to
purchase and thus take title to Dr. Miles’s product from consignees or
other retailers. 21 These contracts bound retailers not to sell below a

14. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 61-62. See also id. at 57, 61 (explaining that prohibition
on restraints of trade was aimed at conduct “producing or tending to produce the consequences of monopoly”); id. at 52 (listing “evils” of monopoly as: 1) the power to fix prices; 2)
the power to limit output; and 3) the danger of deteriorating quality of the monopolized
product); id. at 66 (stating that the rule of reason and the direct/indirect test articulated in
Joint Traffic ban the same conduct and thus “come to one and the same thing”).
15. Id. at 58.
16. Id. at 55. See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW
OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 69 (4th ed. 2011) (explaining that pre-Sherman Act
common law reflected “rules of classical political economy concerning the nature of competition and the efficiency consequences of various anticompetitive practices”).
17. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 63-64.
18. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, at 69 (“One of the great myths about American
antitrust policy is that courts first began to adopt an ‘economic approach’ to antitrust problems in the relatively recent past. . . . [However,] [a]ntitrust has always been closely tied to
prevailing economic doctrine.”).
19. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
20. Id. at 375-79 (reproducing consignment agreements).
21. Id. at 379-81 (reproducing the contract between Dr. Miles and approved retailers).
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particular price.22 In this way, Dr. Miles sought to limit intrabrand
competition, that is, competition between various dealers selling its
own products, thereby leaving competition with other products—
interbrand competition—unscathed.23
The case began as a tort action in federal court premised on diversity of citizenship.24 Dr. Miles alleged that the defendant, an unapproved retailer, had induced approved retailers and consignees to sell
it Dr. Miles’s product below contractually specified prices.25 Dr. Miles
sought to enjoin the practice, claiming that the defendant had tortiously interfered with the price-setting agreements by intentionally
inducing breach.26 The defendant sought to avoid liability by claiming
that the contract directly restrained interstate commerce contrary to
Section 1.27
The Court agreed with the defendant, holding that the agreements between Dr. Miles and approved retailers “relate[d] directly to
interstate as well as intrastate trade, and operate[d] to restrain trade
or commerce among the several States” and had the “purpose” of restraining “the entire trade,” such that the restraint of trade was “obvious.”28 The Court assumed that dealers, and not Dr. Miles, were the
primary beneficiaries of higher retail prices.29 Even if Dr. Miles did
derive some (unspecified) benefit, the Court said, its minimum RPM
would fare no better than a “direct agreement” between dealers to fix
prices.30 But such an agreement, the Court said, would contravene
numerous Sherman Act and common law decisions banning naked
horizontal price fixing.31 In short, the Court equated minimum RPM
22. Id. at 380.
23. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, at 490 (distinguishing intrabrand from interbrand competition).
24. Dr. Miles was an Indiana corporation and Park & Sons was a Kentucky corporation. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 374, 381.
25. Id. at 381-82.
26. Id. at 382.
27. Id. at 390-91.
28. Id. at 400.
29. Id. at 407 (“But the advantage of established retail prices primarily concerns the
dealers. The enlarged profits which would result from adherence to the established rates
would go to them and not to the complainant. It is through the inability of the favored
dealers to realize these profits, on account of the described competition, that the complainant works out its alleged injury.”).
30. Id. at 407-08 (“[T]he complainant can fare no better with its plan of identical contracts than could the dealers themselves if they formed a combination and endeavored to
establish the same restrictions, and thus to achieve the same result, by agreement with
each other. If the immediate advantage they would thus obtain would not be sufficient to
sustain such a direct agreement, the asserted ulterior benefit to the complainant cannot be
regarded as sufficient to support its system.”).
31. Id. at 408 (citing Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904); United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d as modified by 175 U.S. 211
(1899); Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346 (1875); Chapin v. Brown, 83 Iowa 156 (1891); W.H.
Hill Co. v. Gray & Worcester, 127 N.W. 803 (Mich. 1910); People v. Milk Exchange, 145
N.Y. 267 (1895); People v. Sheldon, 139 N.Y. 251 (1893); Judd v. Harrington, 139 N.Y. 105
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with a naked horizontal agreement between thousands of dealers and
thus, not surprisingly, condemned it.32
IV. THE COURT BACKTRACKS AND CONGRESS RESISTS
Dr. Miles had a long and eventful life. Less than a decade after
announcing the decision, the Court limited its reach, holding that
manufacturers were free to announce a price and then terminate
dealers who undercut it, absent an antecedent agreement between
dealer and manufacturer fixing resale prices. 33 Just seven years later, the Court, in an opinion by William Howard Taft, held that the
automatic ban on minimum RPM did not apply when the manufacturer retained title to the product pursuant to a consignment agreement appointing retailers as agents.34 By 1926, then, the Court had
approved two different means of circumventing Dr. Miles. 35
The federal government itself imposed minimum RPM on some
industries during the Great Depression. In 1933, Congress passed,
and President Roosevelt signed, the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA). 36 The Act authorized the President to impose “codes of fair
competition” on an industry-by-industry basis. Within a year of passage, “approximately eighty [such] codes” mandated minimum
RPM. 37 Even before Congress had acted, some states, led by California, had immunized such agreements from attack under their own
antitrust laws, so long as the agreements were truly vertical and took
place in markets characterized by significant interbrand competition. 38
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the NIRA in A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, nullifying federally coerced
(1893)). One of these decisions, it should be noted, involved minimum RPM. See W.H. Hill
Co., 127 N.W. at 804.
32. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, at 491 (Dr. Miles assumed “that RPM is really a
manifestation of price fixing among the retailers, who have involved the manufacturer in
the agreement so that it can help police the cartel.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 156 (1976) (“According to the Court in Dr. Miles, resale price
maintenance benefits dealers (at least ‘primarily’) and is bad because it has the same effect
as a dealers’ cartel.”).
33. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
34. See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 484 (1926).
35. See Hon. William F. Baxter, Vertical Practices—Half Slave, Half Free, 52
ANTITRUST L.J. 743, 744 (1983) (contending that, after Colgate and General Electric, “although the Dr. Miles case was on the books, the industrial world was largely untroubled”).
36. See National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195.
37. See ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY
IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 58-59 (1966).
38. See 1931 Cal. Stat. 583 (authorizing minimum RPM whenever agreements were
vertical and the products governed by such contracts faced “fair and open competition with
commodities of the same general class produced by others”). See also Ewald T. Grether,
Experience in California with Fair Trade Legislation Restricting Price Cutting, 24 CALIF. L.
REV. 640, 640 & n.2 (1936) (reporting that, as of 1935, nine other states, in addition to California, representing forty percent of the nation’s population, had adopted fair trade legislation).
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minimum RPM.39 However, by 1937, forty-two states had authorized
minimum RPM in intrastate commerce. 40 That same year, Congress
passed the Miller-Tydings Act, which gave these “fair trade” statutes
interstate teeth. 41 Passed at the behest of small, less efficient retailers, Miller-Tydings immunized minimum RPM in interstate commerce whenever such agreements were truly vertical and the manufacturer’s product was subject to “full and free competition” from
similar products. 42 The 1952 McGuire Act strengthened MillerTydings, allowing states to authorize the imposition of minimum
RPM on so-called “non-signers,” that is, retailers who refused to enter such agreements.43 At one time (before Alaska and Hawaii entered the Union), forty-six of forty-eight states were so-called “fair
trade” states, though the number fell to thirty-seven out of fifty
by 1975.44
V. DR. MILES REDUX: PRICE THEORY, THE INHOSPITALITY
TRADITION, AND NON-PRICE RESTRAINTS
Non-price vertical restraints received comparatively little attention until nearly four decades after Dr. Miles. In the late 1940s, the
Department of Justice announced its view that vertically imposed exclusive territories were unlawful per se and subsequently obtained
numerous consent decrees banning the practice.45 The FTC attempted to follow suit in the 1960s but met resistance in the lower courts,
which rejected the per se label and validated such restraints under a
forgiving rule of reason. 46 The Department of Justice met similar resistance in the Supreme Court when it sought per se condemnation of
39. See generally 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
40. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 398 (1951) (reporting that, by 1937, forty-two states had adopted fair trade laws).
41. See Miller-Tydings Act, Pub. L. No. 75-314, tit. VIII, 50 Stat. 673, 693 (1937).
42. Id. See also LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST
378 (1977) (reporting support for fair trade “by small retailers facing competition from
more efficient chain[s]”); Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist
Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920-1940, 90 IOWA L. REV.
1011, 1064-67 (2005) (same).
43. See McGuire Act, Pub. L. No. 82-542, 66 Stat. 631 (1952).
44. See AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 9 (Harvey M. Applebaum et al. eds., 1975). Moreover, as of 1975, only sixteen states allowed manufacturers
to enforce such agreements against non-signers. See id. See also Richard K. Bates, Constitutionality of State Fair Trade Acts, 32 IND. L.J. 127, 134 (1957) (reporting that ten state
supreme courts had found non-signer provisions unconstitutional).
45. See Sigmund Timberg, Territorial Exclusives, 29 ANTITRUST L.J. 233, 243 (1965).
46. See Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847, 849 (6th Cir. 1964) (rejecting ban on vertically imposed exclusive territory); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825, 833 (7th Cir.
1963) (same); Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403, 409 (5th Cir.
1962) (finding that exclusive territory imposed ancillary to a trademark license was reasonable). See also Tri-Cont’l Fin. Corp. v. Tropical Marine Enters., 265 F.2d 619, 624-25
(5th Cir. 1959) (sustaining as reasonable agreement preventing purchaser of a vessel from
competing with the seller on certain routes for ten years).
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agreements reserving certain customers to a manufacturer. 47 As of
1963, then, minimum RPM was unlawful per se (except in fair trade
states), while vertical territorial restraints were judged under a
friendly rule of reason.
The enforcement agencies’ attacks on non-price restraints followed
naturally from the dominant economic paradigm of the time, neoclassical price theory. Premised on the perfect competition model,
price theory presumed that unconstrained atomistic markets functioned effectively and that efficiencies were necessarily technological
in nature and thus realized within firms. 48 As a result, agreements
that reached beyond the firm to constrain trading partners were necessarily suspect, because they reduced rivalry without any possible
benefits.49 Scholars operating within this tradition were suspicious of
complete vertical integration and generally condemned partial contractual integration such as tying agreements, exclusive dealing,
RPM, or non-price vertical restraints.50
Shortly after World War II, Courts began to embrace price theory’s account of non-standard agreements, producing the “inhospitality tradition” of antitrust law, a term coined by Donald Turner, the
economist-lawyer who would head the antitrust division during the
1960s. 51 In particular, courts condemned numerous non-standard
47. See generally White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
48. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 370-71 (1985) (explaining how price theory treated
efficiencies as technological in nature and thus as arising “within” the firm).
49. See id. at 366 (According to price theory, “efforts to reconfigure firm and market
structures that violated those ‘natural’ boundaries were believed to have market power origins.”); id. at 371 (“[T]here is nothing to be gained [within price-theoretic paradigm] by introducing nonstandard terms into market-mediated exchange . . . .”).
50. See JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 357-58 (1959) (contending that complete vertical integration was generally motivated by a desire to acquire or protect market
power); JOHN PERRY MILLER, UNFAIR COMPETITION: A STUDY IN CRITERIA FOR THE
CONTROL OF TRADE PRACTICES 199-200 (1941) (contending that tying agreements were
necessarily the result of monopoly power); Derek C. Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the
Problem of Exclusive Arrangements Under the Clayton Act, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 307-08
(arguing that exclusive dealing contracts serve no beneficial purpose); William S. Comanor,
Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 1419, 1419 (1968) (contending that courts should condemn non-price vertical restraints as unlawful per se); Alan J. Meese, Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting:
How the Ghost of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
21, 44-45 (2005) (explaining how price theory’s hostility to non-standard contracts flowed
from the inability to surmise a beneficial purpose of such limits on rivalry); George J.
Stigler, The Extent and Bases of Monopoly, 32 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 8-13, 22 (1942) (concluding that such integration could produce technological efficiencies but usually injured competition); Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 699 (1962) [hereinafter
Turner, Conscious Parallelism] (same); Donald F. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REV. 50, 73-74 (1958) [hereinafter Turner,
Tying Arrangements] (arguing that courts should ban tying contracts).
51. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 5 &
n.8 (2005) (citing Alan J. Meese, Intrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the Firm, 83 N.C.
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agreements as “unreasonable per se” or nearly so, because they: (1)
always reduced rivalry between the parties to them and (2) always
lacked redeeming virtues. 52
Four years after rejecting a per se ban for territorial restraints,
the Supreme Court reversed course, at Turner’s behest, in United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 53 Relying upon Dr. Miles and pricetheoretic logic, the Court condemned non-price vertical restraints,
such as exclusive territories and customer allocations as unreasonable per se, whenever title had passed from manufacturer to dealer.54
Like franchising itself, the Court said, such restraints were not a
“usual” method of business, and they reduced competition without
countervailing virtues.55 At the same time, the Court rejected the bid
by the United States to go even further, that is, to apply the same per
se ban to restraints the defendant had accomplished through consignment arrangements. 56 According to the Court, intrabrand competition was not the only relevant consideration under the rule of reason, and the restraints Schwinn had imposed on consignees did not
restrain (interbrand) competition in the “product market as a
whole.” 57 As a result, the Court said, rule of reason treatment was
appropriate, and there was no reason to disturb the district court’s
finding that the intrabrand restraints contained in the defendant’s
consignment arrangements furthered overall competition.58 Shortly
thereafter the Court held that dealers who had entered minimum
RPM and other non-standard contracts could nonetheless challenge
such agreements, because manufacturers generally employed coercive market power to impose them.59 The Court did not square this

L. REV. 5, 47 (2004) [hereinafter Meese, Intrabrand Restraints]) (attributing this term to
Turner). See also Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003
U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 119-34 (2003) [hereinafter Meese, Rule of Reason] (describing inhospitality tradition’s price-theoretic origins and resulting influence on antitrust doctrine).
52. See Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 51, at 124-34 (detailing these judicial developments). See also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (articulating
this two-part per se rule).
53. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). See also Oliver E. Williamson, Economics and Antitrust Enforcement: Transition Years, 17 ANTITRUST 61, 64 (2003) (describing Turner’s role in government’s Schwinn brief).
54. Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 379 (citing Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U.S. 373 (1911)) (“Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable, without more for a
manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an article may be
traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it.”).
55. Id. (“To permit [post-sale restraints] would sanction franchising and confinement
of distribution as the ordinary instead of the unusual method which may be permissible in
an appropriate and impelling competitive setting, since most merchandise is distributed by
means of purchase and sale.”).
56. Id. at 379-80 (describing the government’s argument).
57. Id. at 381-82.
58. Id. at 380-81 (invoking the trial court’s findings that restraints contained in consignment agreements helped Schwinn compete against mass merchandisers).
59. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
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claim with Dr. Miles’s equation of minimum RPM with a dealer cartel. 60 The Court also banned maximum RPM, which assured consumers lower prices than dealers might charge.61
Following the same dictates of price theory, Congress repealed fair
trade legislation in 1975, thereby restoring Dr. Miles by default. 62
Thus, for the first time in 85 years, both price and non-price agreements were unlawful per se throughout the land, so long as title had
passed to the dealer.63 At the same time, identical agreements imposed via consignment arrangements were analyzed under a forgiving rule of reason. 64
VI. THE REVOLUTION COMETH: TCE DISPLACES PRICE THEORY
Even during the inhospitality era, dissenting scholars rejected
price theory’s focus on technological efficiencies and the resulting
condemnation of vertical restraints. For instance, three decades before Schwinn, Ronald Coase offered a non-technological explanation
for the existence of firms and thus vertical integration. 65 According to
Coase, the firm was a particular type of contract, whereby employees
agreed to follow the directives of employers within a broad range.66
Moreover, Coase argued that economic actors rely upon firms to conduct economic activity when the alternative—reliance upon atomistic
markets—results in prohibitive costs, what economists would later
call transaction costs. 67 Thus, Coase implied that technological considerations were beside the point because, absent transaction costs,
independent economic actors who owned each distinct phase of the
production process could bargain to employ the most efficient process.68 Moreover, while Coase did not explicitly say so, his insight al60. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
61. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968).
62. See Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801. See also
SULLIVAN, supra note 42, at 378-79 (discussing repeal of fair trade laws with approval); id.
at 14-17 (discussing various price-theoretic texts as sources of economic learning relevant
to antitrust); id. at 379-87 (articulating classic price-theoretic objections to minimum
RPM).
63. See supra notes 35, 54-58 and accompanying text (explaining how Colgate, General Electric, and Schwinn limited the per se rule to instances of actual agreement between
manufacturer and dealer regarding product whose title had passed).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379-82 (1967) (analyzing territorial restraints imposed via consignment agreements under a forgiving rule of
reason).
65. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
66. Id. at 390-91.
67. See id. at 391-92; see also Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57
AM. ECON. REV. 347, 349 (1967) (employing the term “transaction costs”).
68. See Victor P. Goldberg, Production Functions, Transaction Costs and the New Institutionalism, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY MICROECONOMICS AND WELFARE 395, 397-98
(George R. Feiwel ed., 1985) (explaining that technical economies cannot explain firm
boundaries because, absent transaction costs, such economies can “be achieved equally well
if the factors of production are owned by independent individuals”).
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so suggested a non-technological explanation for partial integration,
that is, contractual integration that stood somewhere between “firm”
and “market.” 69
However, as Coase himself has admitted, his work was “much cited and little used.” 70 Certainly Coase’s lessons were lost on the price
theorists who ritually condemned partial contractual integration.
These scholars simply could not explain such agreements absent a
hypothesis of monopoly power.71 It was not until 1960 that scholars
offered beneficial accounts of non-standard agreements, accounts
that resonated with Coase’s transaction cost insight. Most famously,
Lester Telser contended that manufacturers who rely upon market
transactions—sales to independent dealers—to distribute their products might adopt minimum RPM for reasons contrary to the interests
of those dealers.72 In particular, Telser contended that, left to their
own devices, dealers might “free ride” on efforts by other dealers to
promote the manufacturer’s product, efforts that required investments that dealers could not recover once made. 73 The prospect of
such free riding, he said, might deter dealers from making such investments. 74 By imposing minimum RPM, Telser said, manufacturers
could prevent low service dealers from luring away customers with
price cuts, thereby ensuring that dealers who did make such investments would recoup them. 75 While Telser did not mention Coase or
“transaction costs,” his insight identified costs of market transacting—free riding, market failure, and suboptimal promotion—that manufacturers could avoid by means of partial contractual integration.76
While the Supreme Court and the enforcement agencies ignored
Telser’s work, others did not. Most notably, Robert Bork embraced
and expanded Telser’s argument, arguing that non-price vertical restraints, such as exclusive territories, could also prevent free riding.77

69. See R.H. Coase, Nature of the Firm: Meaning, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 19, 29-30
(1988) (discussing unpublished notes from the 1930s assessing transaction cost rationales
for partial integration).
70. See R.H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in POLICY
ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 62-63 (Victor R.
Fuchs ed., 1972).
71. See Meese, supra note 50, at 44-45 (explaining how price theory’s hostility to nonstandard contracts flowed from the inability to surmise any beneficial purpose of such limits on rivalry).
72. See Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 86, 86-87 (1960).
73. Id. at 91-92.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Meese, supra note 50, at 52-53 (contending that Telser’s insight was an early
application of TCE).
77. See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966) [hereinafter Bork, Price Fixing]. See also Robert
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Moreover, Bork expressly embraced Coase’s assertion that “the firm”
was simply one form of contractual integration and argued that partial contractual integration, including minimum RPM and exclusive
territories, could also produce efficiencies.78 As a result, Bork said,
courts should treat partial integration the same way as, say, complete integration by merger, validating both absent an affirmative
showing of anticompetitive harm.79 Moreover, Bork did not limit his
analysis to vertical restraints, but applied the same reasoning to
some horizontal restraints. 80 Such an approach, he said, would simply replicate the approach taken with respect to other ancillary restraints, such as covenants ancillary to the formation of a partnership, which Bork treated as a paradigmatic case in which nonstandard contracts could overcome market failure. 81
Other scholars soon embraced and elaborated upon the TelserBork line of argument. 82 Among these scholars was Oliver Williamson, who, like Coase, would later win the Nobel Prize for his work articulating the transaction cost paradigm. 83 While a special employee
at the Department of Justice, Williamson had objected to the government’s brief in Schwinn.84 Eight years later, Williamson suggested that vertical integration was presumptively an effort to minimize
transaction costs.85 Four years after that he suggested that market
restrictions like those condemned in Schwinn were presumptively
methods of economizing on transaction costs, including the harm

H. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare, 77 YALE L.J. 950 (1968) [hereinafter Bork, Resale Price Maintenance].
78. See Bork, Price Fixing, supra note 77, at 384 n.29; id. at 474; Meese, supra note
50, at 53-54 (describing Bork’s reliance on Coase’s transaction cost reasoning).
79. See Bork, Price Fixing, supra note 77, at 472 (footnote omitted) (citing Coase, supra note 65) (“In economic analysis, a contract integration is as much a firm as an ownership integration. The nature of the standards applied to them through the Sherman Act
should be the same.”). Ironically, Coase was unaware of Bork’s work when he claimed that
his article, while cited during the 1960s, had no “noticeable effect on what was written in
the text.” See Coase, supra note 69, at 23.
80. See Bork, Price Fixing, supra note 77, at 429-38 (discussing the benefits of horizontal and vertical intrabrand restraints interchangeably in support of rule of reason
treatment for both).
81. Id. at 380-82.
82. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53
ANTITRUST L.J. 135 (1984); Victor P. Goldberg, The Law and Economics of Vertical Restrictions: A Relational Perspective, 58 TEX. L. REV. 91 (1979); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust
Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975).
83. See Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Prize in Economic Sciences 2009 (Oct. 12, 2009), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/
laureates/2009/press.pdf.
84. See Williamson, supra note 53, at 64 (recounting this objection).
85. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 20 (1975) (footnote omitted) (stating that “a presumption of market failure is warranted where it is observed that transactions are shifted out of a market
and into a firm”).
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caused by opportunistic free riding by dealers. 86 As Bork had done
over a decade earlier, Williamson analogized the (beneficial) impact
of such non-price vertical restraints to the impact of minimum
RPM. 87 Moreover, Williamson would subsequently reiterate that TCE
dictates a “rebuttable presumption” that complete integration or partial integration via non-standard contract reflects voluntary cooperation between economic actors that reduces the cost of transacting and
thus increases economic welfare.88
As Williamson would later explain, these developments reflected a
genuine scientific revolution in industrial organization theory.89
Moreover, this revolution had implications far beyond the law of vertical restraints or, for that matter, antitrust. 90 Indeed, scholars have
employed transaction cost reasoning to problems as varied as international security arrangements, 91 company towns,92 sharecropping,93
and marriage.94 In short, the economics profession has embraced TCE
as a theoretical apparatus that can inform research agendas in a va-

86. See Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 955 (1979) [hereinafter
Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions] (explaining that “free rid[ing]” was an
example of “subgoal pursuit” by franchisees that could undermine the franchise system).
See also Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Considerations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1440 n.3 (1974) [hereinafter Williamson, The Economics of
Antitrust] (stating, without additional explanation, that “the [restraints challenged in
Schwinn] can usefully be examined in transaction cost terms”).
87. See Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions, supra note 86, at 958 n.26
(explaining that both minimum RPM and exclusive territories can combat such free riding)
(citing POSNER, supra note 32, at 149-50, 160, 185; Telser, supra note 72, at 86).
88. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 48, at 28 (contending that there is “a rebuttable presumption that nonstandard forms of contracting have efficiency purposes”); Williamson,
Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions, supra note 86, at 958 (“The basic presumption of
the transaction cost approach is that successive interfaces are organized in a manner that
economizes on transaction costs.”). See also Alan J. Meese, Market Power and Contract
Formation: How Outmoded Economic Theory Still Distorts Antitrust Doctrine, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1291 (2013) (explaining how TCE implies that parties enter efficient nonstandard contacts voluntarily).
89. See Alan J. Meese, Reframing Antitrust in Light of Scientific Revolution: Accounting for Transaction Costs in Rule of Reason Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 457 (2010). See also
Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. L.J. 271, 274 (1987) (concluding that
TCE and the resulting reinterpretation of vertical integration was a manifestation of a
“genuine scientific revolution”).
90. For a summary of the influence of transaction cost reasoning in antitrust, see Paul
L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 95 (2002).
91. See Katja Weber, Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: A Transaction Costs Approach to
International Security Cooperation, 41 INT’L STUD. Q. 321 (1997).
92. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 48, at 35-38.
93. See Douglas W. Allen & Dean Lueck, Transaction Costs and the Design of
Cropshare Contracts, 24 RAND J. ECON. 78 (1993).
94. See Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents: Or, “I Gave Him the Best
Years of My Life,” 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267 (1987).
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riety of fields. 95 This ability to inspire and inform disparate research agendas or “normal science” is the hallmark of a successful
scientific paradigm. 96
VII. THE SUPREME COURT JOINS THE REVOLUTION:
FROM SYLVANIA TO LEEGIN
Just two years after Congress repudiated “fair trade,” the Supreme Court abandoned the consistent treatment of price and nonprice vertical restraints, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc. 97 There, the Court reconsidered Schwinn. The Court rejected
Schwinn’s dispositive focus on the passage of title, holding that no
meaningful economic distinction justified disparate treatment of sale
and non-sale transactions. 98 Moreover, the Court announced that
courts should examine both types of restraints under the rule of reason, thus overruling Schwinn’s recent and novel per se ban on some
non-price restraints.99
The Court conceded that non-price restraints necessarily reduced
intrabrand competition, that is, competition between dealers.100 However, the mere fact that a restraint always reduced such competition
did not thereby render it unlawful per se under prevailing doctrine,
the Court said.101 Instead, such restraints also had to lack redeeming
virtues to merit such outright condemnation.102 Relying upon recent
advances in economic theory, more precisely TCE, the Court concluded that such restraints could produce redeeming virtues in some cases, thereby undermining the case for per se condemnation. 103 Most
famously, the Court asserted that such agreements could encourage

95. See Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction
Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 335, 336-38 (1995) (recounting various other applications of TCE).
96. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(1962).
97. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
98. Id. at 47-57.
99. Id. at 57-59.
100. Id. at 54 (“Vertical restrictions reduce intrabrand competition by limiting the
number of sellers of a particular product competing for the business of a given group of
buyers.”).
101. See infra notes 127-47 and accompanying text (describing the two-part per se rule
applied during the inhospitality era).
102. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
5 (1958)). See also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
103. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-58 (noting that such restraints might produce “redeeming virtue[s],” thereby obviating per se condemnation, and explaining that restraints
can aid in maintaining interbrand competition (citing Posner, supra note 82, at 283, 285,
287-88; Bork, Price Fixing, supra note 77, at 403)). See also Oliver E. Williamson, Symposium on Antitrust Law and Economics, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 918, 920 (1979) (explaining that
Sylvania assumed that “the transaction-cost approach provide[s] a sounder basis for antitrust enforcement in this area”).

926

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:907

dealers to promote the manufacturer’s product by ensuring that a
dealer could capture the benefits of promotional investments. 104
Absent such restrictions, the Court said, dealers could locate anywhere they wished, and dealers who declined to engage in promotion
could free ride on those who did. 105 The prospect of such free riding
could deter all dealers from engaging in promotion, thereby hampering interbrand competition, which the Court characterized as “the
primary concern of antitrust law.” 106 Because such restraints could
produce such redeeming virtues, the Court said, courts should not
condemn them unless fact-intensive rule of reason scrutiny established that they produced harm. 107 However, the Court emphasized that it had no intent to disturb Dr. Miles’s per se ban on
minimum RPM. 108
The Court’s simultaneous (re)embrace of Dr. Miles and invocation
of the free riding rationale to justify overruling Schwinn was ironic.
After all, scholars had first articulated the free riding rationale in the
context of minimum RPM. 109 Others, including Robert Bork and Oliver Williamson, later extended this rationale to non-price restraints
as part of the larger transaction cost revolution. 110 Thus, invocation of
this rationale to justify rule of reason treatment for non-price restraints seemed to undermine Dr. Miles. Indeed, concurring in Sylvania, Justice White resisted the free rider rationale because it
would also call Dr. Miles into question. 111 As he put it, “[t]he effect, if
not the intention, of the Court’s opinion is necessarily to call into
question the firmly established per se rule against price restraints.”112
Scholars agreed that the rationale of Sylvania, if applied consistently, would ultimately require the Court to repudiate Dr. Miles. 113
Sylvania was not a “one off” or a sport, but instead became a driving force behind widespread reformulation of antitrust doctrine over
the next three decades, reformulation that paralleled scientific advances brought about by the TCE revolution.114 In NCAA v. Board of
104. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-56.
105. Id. at 55.
106. Id. at 52 n.19.
107. Id. at 57-59.
108. Id. at 51 n.18 (“The per se illegality of price restrictions has been established firmly for many years and involves significantly different questions of analysis and policy.”).
109. See Telser, supra note 72, at 91-92.
110. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text (collecting authorities).
111. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 69 (White, J., concurring) (“[T]he economic arguments in
favor of allowing vertical nonprice restraints generally apply to vertical price restraints as
well.”).
112. Id. at 70.
113. See Robert H. Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 SUP. CT. REV.
171; Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:
Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981).
114. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, at 46-56 (describing numerous applications of
TCE in the antitrust context). See also Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 51, at 134-44 (de-
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Regents of the University of Oklahoma, for instance, the Court invoked Sylvania for the proposition that horizontal restraints on competition “in a limited aspect of a market may actually enhance marketwide competition,” thereby preventing per se condemnation of the
restraints before the Court. 115 Shortly thereafter, in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., the Court cited Sylvania for
the proposition “that there is a presumption in favor of a rule-ofreason standard” and “that interbrand competition is the primary
concern of the antitrust laws.” 116 The Court also invoked Sylvania for
the proposition that “[t]he Sherman Act adopted the term ‘restraint
of trade’ along with its dynamic potential. It invokes the common law
itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890.” 117 As a result, the Court said, changed
economic understandings of the impact of trade restraints could justify reversal of a decision that depended upon a different understanding. 118 The Court also relied upon Sylvania for the proposition that an
agreement between a dealer and a manufacturer to terminate another, price-cutting dealer could reflect a procompetitive effort to combat
free riding by the latter. 119
The Court again invoked Sylvania a decade later, when reconsidering and reversing the per se ban on maximum RPM. 120 The Court
unanimously reiterated Sylvania’s conclusion “that the primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect interbrand competition.” 121 The
Court also reiterated that Congress expected the courts to draw upon
dynamic common law tradition when implementing the Sherman Act
and that it was appropriate to “reconsider[] its decisions construing
the Sherman Act when the theoretical underpinnings of those decisions are called into serious question.” 122

scribing the evolution of TCE and its influence on the scope of per se rules during this period); Timothy J. Muris, Improving the Economic Foundations of Competition Policy, 12 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1, 11-23 (2003) (describing the relevance of TCE for various antitrust problems).
115. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984). See also Meese,
supra note 50, at 28-29 (describing this aspect of NCAA).
116. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988).
117. Id. at 732 (citing Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21).
118. See id. at 731 (“The term ‘restraint of trade’ in the statute, like the term at common law, refers not to a particular list of agreements, but to a particular economic consequence, which may be produced by quite different sorts of agreements in varying times and
circumstances. The changing content of the term ‘restraint of trade’ was well recognized at
the time the Sherman Act was enacted.”).
119. See id. (invoking Sylvania for the proposition that “manufacturers are often motivated by a legitimate desire to have dealers provide services, combined with the reality
that price cutting is frequently made possible by ‘free riding’ on the services provided by
other dealers”).
120. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
121. Id. at 15 (citing Business Electronics, 485 U.S. at 726).
122. Id. at 21.
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The Supreme Court finally accepted what Justice White had characterized as Sylvania’s invitation to overrule Dr. Miles in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 123 There, the plaintiff, a retailer, challenged the defendant’s nationwide imposition of minimum
RPM. 124 In the lower court, the defendant offered to prove, via expert
testimony, that the restraint was necessary to reduce the cost of
transacting—relying upon the market to distribute its goods—by
overcoming a market failure and encouraging approved retailers to
promote the defendant’s products. 125 Relying on Dr. Miles, both the
trial court and the Fifth Circuit rejected this offer to prove that a per
se unlawful practice produced benefits. 126
The Court began its analysis by adopting the same standard for
per se liability as Sylvania or, for that matter, numerous cases from
the inhospitality era. That is, to merit per se condemnation, a restraint must have “ ‘manifestly anticompetitive’ effects” and, in addition, “lack . . . any redeeming virtue.” 127 The Court acknowledged that
minimum RPM could, under some conditions, pose anticompetitive
risks. 128 For instance, industry-wide minimum RPM could facilitate a
manufacturer cartel by discouraging a manufacturer from cutting
prices, because dealers could not pass those discounts on to consumers. 129 However, relying upon the sort of transaction cost reasoning
employed in Sylvania and subsequent decisions, the Court explained
that economists had identified numerous “procompetitive effects” associated with minimum RPM, benefits that had not been apparent to
the Dr. Miles Court. 130 These benefits, the Court said, were similar to
benefits produced by non-price vertical restraints, benefits the Court
had recognized as “redeeming virtues” in Sylvania and subsequent
decisions. 131 For instance, the Court said, minimum RPM could prevent dealers from free riding on each other’s promotional services,
encouraging dealers to make promotional investments.132 Moreover,
minimum RPM could facilitate a manufacturer’s reliance upon dealers who have cultivated a reputation for selling high quality merchandise, thereby allowing consumers to rely upon such retailers’

123. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
124. Id. at 882-84 (detailing the history and content of the restraint).
125. Id. at 884-85 (detailing lower court proceedings).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 886 (quoting Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977);
Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985)).
128. See id. at 892-94.
129. Id. at 892.
130. Id. at 889 (“[E]conomics literature is replete with procompetitive justifications for
a manufacturer’s use of [minimum] resale price maintenance.”).
131. Id. at 890 (“The justifications for vertical price restraints are similar to those for
other vertical restraints.” (citing Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-57)).
132. See id. at 890-91 (citing POSNER, supra note 32, at 172-73).
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certification of the quality of the products in question.133 By preventing discounting, the Court said, minimum RPM can protect the economic viability of firms that make the investments necessary to
maintain a high quality operation.134 As a result, the Court said, minimum RPM could facilitate interbrand competition, including new
entry by upstart manufacturers who could assure themselves of promotion and/or quality certification adequate to wrest consumers
away from established brands.135
The Court also invoked literature contending that minimum RPM
can produce benefits in retail markets not susceptible to free riding.
By granting dealers a guaranteed margin, minimum RPM can ensure
that dealers expect to receive a stream of earnings greater than they
would receive in a perfectly competitive market. 136 Dealers will forfeit
these earnings (what economists call a “performance bond”) if terminated, giving the manufacturer a powerful tool for ensuring dealers’
compliance with the manufacturer’s expectations for dealer performance.137 Each of these explanations was an application of TCE,
which predicts that unconstrained dealers may behave opportunistically, imposing costs on manufacturers and consumers. 138 Each also
depended upon the assumption, articulated in Sylvania and subse-

133. See id. at 891 (citing Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, Resale Price
Maintenance and Quality Certification, 15 RAND J. ECON. 346, 347-49 (1984)).
134. See id.
135. Id. at 890-91 (Minimum RPM “can increase interbrand competition by facilitating
market entry for new firms and brands.”).
136. Id. at 892 (“Offering the retailer a guaranteed margin and threatening termination if it does not live up to expectations may be the most efficient way to expand the manufacturer’s market share by inducing the retailer’s performance and allowing it to use its
own initiative and experience in providing valuable services.”).
137. See id. The Court also opined that this strategy would allow manufacturers to rely
upon dealer “initiative and experience in providing valuable services.” Id. However, the
Court did not explain how a manufacturer could pursue a strategy of relying upon dealers’
individual judgments about appropriate promotional strategies while at the same time
possessing concrete, enforceable expectations about what strategies dealers should pursue,
expectations that could form the basis for a decision to terminate a dealer. See Alan J.
Meese, Property Rights and Intrabrand Restraints, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 553, 615-16 (2004)
(questioning the claim that manufacturers employ performance bonds to enforce particular
promotional expectations). Nonetheless, this shortcoming does not itself undermine this
“performance bond” theory of minimum RPM. That is, a manufacturer may wish to demand a performance bond from its dealers even if it does not mean to rely upon their expertise in choosing promotional strategies. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy,
Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266-67
(1988) (explaining reasons that may induce manufacturers to demand performance bonds
to assure dealer performance of obligations unrelated to promotional free riding). Moreover, where manufacturers do wish to decentralize promotional decisionmaking, minimum
RPM and non-price vertical restraints can serve as contractual property rights, ensuring
that dealers who make promotional investments internalize the benefits of doing so. See
Bork, supra note 77, at 956; Meese, supra, at 595-607; see also Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1982).
138. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
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quently reaffirmed, that interbrand competition is the primary concern of antitrust. 139
The Court did not assert that minimum RPM always or even usually produces one or more of the benefits just identified. Instead, the
Court merely concluded that beneficial minimum RPM is neither infrequent nor hypothetical. 140 As a result, the Court could not conclude
that minimum RPM “always or almost always tend[s] to restrict
competition and decrease output,” with the result that such contracts should, like non-price restraints, receive fact-intensive rule of
reason scrutiny. 141
Of course, Dr. Miles was a long-standing precedent. 142 Nonetheless, invoking Sylvania and other decisions, the Court explained that
the doctrine of stare decisis had less weight in the antitrust context,
given the common law nature of the Sherman Act. 143 The Court had
relied upon similar TCE-based arguments when rejecting bans on
non-price vertical restraints and maximum price fixing; there was no
reason to ignore such new learning in the context of minimum
RPM. 144 This learning, of course, had undermined the central premise
of Dr. Miles, namely, that minimum RPM is economically indistinguishable from naked horizontal price fixing between dealers.145 Indeed, retaining Dr. Miles would call Sylvania and its progeny into
question. 146 Finally, the ban on minimum RPM could simply encourage manufacturers to respond by adopting non-price restraints that
were less efficient, and sometimes more anticompetitive, simply because such restrictions were treated less harshly than
price restraints. 147

139. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 890 (“[T]he primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect [interbrand] competition.” (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 15 (1997))).
140. See id. at 894 (“[A]lthough empirical evidence on the topic is limited, it does not
suggest efficient uses of the agreements are infrequent or hypothetical.”).
141. Id. at 894 (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723
(1988)).
142. See, e.g., 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 341-43 (1987) (finding that New
York’s regulatory imposition of minimum resale liquor prices contravened Dr. Miles); Cont’l
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977) (reaffirming Dr. Miles in dicta).
143. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899 (“Stare decisis is not as significant in this case, however, because the issue before us is the scope of the Sherman Act. . . . From the beginning the
Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute.”).
144. Id. at 900-02 (“[T]he Court, following a common-law approach, has continued to
temper, limit, or overrule once strict prohibitions on vertical restraints.”).
145. Id. at 888 (describing Dr. Miles’s unjustified equation of manufacturer-imposed
minimum RPM with horizontal collusion between dealers).
146. Id. at 902 (“If we were to decide the procompetitive effects of resale price maintenance were insufficient to overrule Dr. Miles, then cases such as Colgate and GTE Sylvania
themselves would be called into question.”).
147. Id. For instance, the Court noted that exclusive territories by their nature eliminate all forms of competition between dealers, while minimum RPM merely limits price
competition. Id. at 903-04.

2013]

ASSORTED ANTI-LEEGIN CANARDS

931

VIII. THE NEW RESISTANCE
Many accepted Leegin as a straightforward application of TCE to
minimum RPM, given the Court’s common law authority to adjust
doctrine in light of new learning.148 However, some scholars, lawyers,
and political actors have chosen to resist Leegin to the utmost. Such
resistance has taken many forms. For instance, just as industry
sought legislative relief from Dr. Miles, some current and former enforcement officials, including the attorneys general of forty-one
states, have asked Congress for relief from Leegin. 149 Some members
of Congress introduced bills that would do just that, i.e., amend the
Sherman Act to codify Dr. Miles. 150 The Senate Judiciary Committee
approved one such bill in November 2011, after receiving testimony
from low-cost retailers critical of Leegin. 151 Others have invoked “antitrust federalism” and advocated state legislation banning minimum
RPM. 152 Several state attorneys general have brought post-Leegin actions against minimum RPM, urging courts to ignore Leegin and condemn such restraints outright under existing state antitrust laws.153
148. Thomas A. Lambert, Dr. Miles Is Dead. Now What?: Structuring a Rule of Reason
for Evaluating Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1937, 1940-41
(2009).
149. See, e.g., Testimony before the Subcomm. on Courts & Competition Policy, H.R.,
Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Pamela Jones Harbour, Comm’r, Federal Trade Commission) [hereinafter Harbour Testimony 2009], available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Harbour090428.pdf; The Leegin Decision: The End
of the Consumer Discounts or Good Antitrust Policy?: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 6-8 (2007) (statement of Robert Pitofsky, Sheehy Professor of Antitrust Law and
Regulation, Georgetown University Law School) [hereinafter Leegin Senate Judiciary
Hearing], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg41548/pdf/CHRG110shrg41548.pdf; Letter from 41 State Attorneys General, Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen., in
Support for the Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act of 2009 (H.R. 3190) to Rep. John
Conyers, Chairman, House Judiciary Comm., U.S. House of Representatives and Rep. Lamar Smith, Ranking Member, House Judiciary Comm., U.S. House of Representatives
(Oct. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Letter from 41 State Attorneys General], available at
http://www.naag.org/assets/files/pdf/signons/20091027.HR_3190.pdf.
150. See, e.g., Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act, S. 75, 112th Cong. (2011);
Discount Pricing and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3190, 111th Cong. (2009).
151. See Jeffrey May, Senate Bill Restoring Per Se Rule for Resale Price Maintenance
Passes Senate Judiciary Committee, TRADE REG. TALK (Nov. 7, 2011, 1:36 PM),
http://traderegulation.blogspot.com/2011/11/senate-bill-restoring-per-se-rule-for.html. See
also Leegin Senate Judiciary Hearing, supra note 149, at 8-10 (reproducing testimony of
one such retailer).
152. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 11-204(b) (West 2009); Joseph Pereira, State Law
Targets ‘Minimum Pricing,’ WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB124087840110661643.html. See also Richard A. Duncan & Allison K. Guernsey, Waiting
for the Other Shoe to Drop: Will State Courts Follow Leegin?, 27 FRANCHISE L.J. 173, 174
(2008) (identifying at least thirteen states where minimum RPM is likely unlawful per se
under current law).
153. See New York v. Herman Miller, Inc., No. 08-CV-02977, 2008-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
¶ 76,454 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 25, 2008) (stipulated final judgment and consent decree
awarding damages and banning minimum RPM under state law); California v. Bioelements, Inc., No. 10011659, 2011 WL 486328 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 11, 2011) (proposed
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Private parties, too, have invoked state laws when attacking such restraints; just last year one state supreme court declared the restraint
challenged in Leegin unlawful per se within its own borders.154 Finally, some scholars and most states have embraced a temporary
fallback position, contending that, so long as Leegin is good law, federal courts should subject minimum RPM to the “quick look” version
of the rule of reason, under which the mere existence of a challenged
restraint establishes a prima facie case, thereby casting upon
the defendant a burden of adducing evidence that the restraint
produces benefits.155
There is, of course, no constitutional or other barrier preventing
Congress or the states from reinstating Dr. Miles. There is a long history of Congress overriding straightforward applications of the
Sherman Act, either to exempt otherwise unlawful conduct or to ban
reasonable conduct that would otherwise create wealth, sometimes at
the behest of special interest groups that stand to benefit from such
exceptions.156 Fair trade legislation provides an example of the former, while the 1935 Robinson-Patman Act is a prime example of the
latter.157 Like fair trade legislation, Robinson-Patman, which bans
certain forms of price discrimination, was passed at the behest of
small retailers, who feared that more efficient chains would obtain
volume discounts from manufacturers and pass such discounts on
to consumers.158

final judgment including permanent injunction detailing a consent decree banning minimum RPM under state law); People v. Tempur-Pedic Intl., Inc., 944 N.Y.S.2d 518 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2012) (considering a state challenge to minimum RPM under New York law). See
also Alan M. Barr, Antitrust Federalism in Action—State Challenges to Vertical Price Fixing in the Post-Leegin World, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2009, at 1 (describing these and
other post-Leegin challenges to minimum RPM).
154. See O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 277 P.3d 1062, 1086-88 (Kan.
2012) (declaring minimum RPM unlawful per se under Kansas antitrust law). But cf. Spahr
v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., No. 2:07-CV-187, 2008 WL 3914461, at *7 (E.D. Tenn.
Aug. 20, 2008) (applying the rule of reason under Tennessee law).
155. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (elaborating on the “quick look”
framework); John B. Kirkwood, Rethinking Antitrust Policy Toward RPM, 55 ANTITRUST
BULL. 423 (2010); see also infra notes 292-94 and accompanying text (collecting authorities
contending that courts should subject minimum RPM to a “quick look” analysis).
156. See, e.g., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
APRIL 2007 Ch. IV.B (2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report
_recommendation/letter_to_president.pdf (detailing various exemptions from the antitrust
laws); Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War
with Each Other, 121 YALE L.J. 2216 (2012) (contending that the new federal consumer
protection regime rejects consumer sovereignty and bans conduct that would be unobjectionable under consumer-centered antitrust policy).
157. Robinson-Patman Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1936)).
158. See Schragger, supra note 42, at 1060-66 (describing the anti-efficiency impetus
for the Robinson-Patman Act). See also Ward S. Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70, 70-71 (1967) (describing anti-consumer
consequences of the Robinson-Patman Act).
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Indeed, as explained earlier, Congress has sometimes even imposed anticompetitive restraints against parties’ will.159 States too
are free to coerce their citizens into conduct that would be felonious if
adopted by private parties, even when such “regulation” destroys
wealth and transfers income from out-of-state consumers to in-state
producers or from one set of producers to the other.160 They may also
ban conduct that would be wealth-creating and thus lawful under the
Sherman Act.161
However, Leegin’s detractors have not invoked the authority of
states or the national government to ban otherwise reasonable restraints. Moreover, these advocates would reject any analogy to fair
trade legislation or the Robinson-Patman Act. Instead they argue
that Leegin “got it wrong” when applying basic antitrust principles
animating the rule of reason. Moreover, legislation proposed in 2011
that would have codified Dr. Miles was premised upon a finding that
Leegin “incorrectly interpreted the Sherman Act.”162 For those who
resist Leegin, then, a Congressional or state per se ban on minimum
RPM or judicial adoption of a “quick look” approach would merely
undo the Court’s purported mistake.
The remaining parts of this Article identify and refute numerous
arguments that those resisting Leegin have made for restoring Dr.
Miles. Each argument, it is seen, rejects TCE, basic antitrust principles, or both. As a result, one cannot characterize restoration of Dr.
Miles as a bona fide application of Standard Oil’s rule of reason. Instead, reimposition of the ban on minimum RPM would constitute a
rejection of the “more accurate economic conceptions”163 that should
drive antitrust doctrine and thus be akin to a welfare-reducing special interest exemption from basic antitrust principles.
IX. REFUTING THE RESISTANCE
This part recounts and refutes various arguments made by those
who resist Leegin. Simply put, TCE undermines the central economic
premise of Dr. Miles, namely, that minimum RPM is the equivalent
of a naked dealer cartel. Leegin’s detractors have not carried their
burden of articulating and supporting a substitute rationale for per se

159. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (describing so-called “codes of fair
competition” imposed under the NIRA).
160. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (rejecting Sherman Act and dormant
commerce clause challenges to state-imposed raisin cartel).
161. See California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990) (holding that states may ban
mergers that are lawful under federal law).
162. See S. 75, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(5) (2011) (asserting that Leegin “incorrectly interpreted the Sherman Act”).
163. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55 (1911).
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condemnation. Instead, each such argument rests upon a rejection of
TCE, basic antitrust principles, or both.
A. Leegin Is Correct Even if Free Riding Is “Rare”
Some who resist Leegin have asserted that the sort of “free riding”
invoked by Leegin is rare, with the result that most minimum RPM
agreements are likely anticompetitive.164 However, Leegin does not
depend upon the assumption that dealer free riding is common. On
the contrary, Leegin depends upon a far weaker assumption, namely,
that free riding is sometimes present in those industries in which
manufacturers choose to adopt minimum RPM, thereby undermining
Dr. Miles’s assumption that such agreements are necessarily equivalent to a dealer cartel.165
To be sure, proponents of TCE have asserted that transaction
costs and thus market failures are “ubiquitous,” a fact confirmed by
the very existence of firms which, according to TCE, arise to overcome such costs and failure.166 Moreover, these scholars have contended that any number of non-standard contracts can reduce transaction costs.167 However, Leegin only purports to apply in those
industries where firms have adopted a particular form of nonstandard contract, namely, minimum RPM; the decision made no assumption about how many firms will do so. Indeed, during the fair
trade era, the vast majority of firms in states that adopted fair trade
laws, which were more permissive than the rule of reason analysis
contemplated by Leegin, declined to adopt minimum RPM.168 Section
1 of the Sherman Act speaks only to those contracts that parties actually employ. Thus, a finding that free riding is only possible in

164. See, e.g., Pamela Jones Harbour, A Tale of Two Marks, and Other Antitrust Concerns, 20 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 32, 44-45 (2007) (contending that the sort of free riding
identified in Leegin occurs in “rare and narrow circumstances”); Marina Lao, Resale Price
Maintenance: A Reassessment of its Competitive Harms and Benefits, in MORE COMMON
GROUND FOR INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW? 59, 73-74 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2011);
Leegin Senate Judiciary Hearing, supra note 149, at 7. See also Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 916 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
free riding is relatively rare (citing Robert Pitofsky, Why Dr. Miles Was Right, 8
REGULATION 27, 29-30 (1984))); Letter from 41 State Attorneys General, supra note 149, at
2 (invoking supposed absence of evidence that minimum RPM creates benefits); Brief of the
American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 19-20, Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480) (use of RPM
to combat free riding is “not common or important”).
165. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (explaining Dr. Miles’s equation of minimum RPM and dealer cartels).
166. See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 26 (1988) (contending that
transaction costs and resulting market failure are “ubiquitous”).
167. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
168. See Edward S. Herman, A Statistical Note on Fair Trade, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 583,
584 (1959) (reporting that around one percent of the nation’s manufacturers employed minimum RPM in fair trade states).
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a small fraction of the nation’s industries is entirely consistent
with Leegin.
What if, however, we were to determine (somehow) that most industries in which minimum RPM is present are not susceptible to
dealer free riding? Assume, for instance, that minimum RPM is present in twenty percent of the nation’s industries, but that conditions
conducive to free riding are only present in one quarter of them, that
is, five percent. Surely these data would undermine Leegin.
In fact, such data would not call Leegin into question. Full-blown
rule of reason treatment of a category of restraints does not depend
upon an assertion that most of the restraints in question produce
significant benefits. Instead, as explained earlier, a category of
agreements is unlawful per se if the agreements within the category
necessarily have a “pernicious effect on competition” and, in addition,
“lack . . . redeeming virtue[s].”169 Put another way, conduct is unlawful per se if, based on experience, courts determine that full-blown
rule of reason scrutiny will “always” or “almost always” condemn
such agreements.170 Under this formulation, which Leegin’s detractors do not seem to question, it is not enough that a restraint would
“usually” or “probably” fail rule of reason scrutiny. Per se rules are
stilettos, not bludgeons.
In any event, control of free riding is not the only possible “redeeming virtue” of minimum RPM. Leegin also opined that, for instance, minimum RPM could create a performance bond that dealers
would forfeit if terminated for shirking non-promotional obligations.171 Practitioners of TCE developed this rationale to explain why
minimum RPM occurs in markets where free riding is unlikely.172
Hence, dispositive proof that free riding never occurs would not undermine Leegin. Thus, this argument for restoring Dr. Miles rests
upon a flawed understanding of TCE’s case against Dr. Miles, a misapplication of the standard for per se illegality, or both.

169. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886 (“To justify a per se prohibition a restraint must have
‘manifestly anticompetitive effects’ and ‘lack . . . any redeeming virtue[.]’ ” (citations omitted)); Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289
(1985) (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)); Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) (same). See also supra notes 127-47 and accompanying text (describing the two-part per se rule developed during the inhospitality era).
170. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“Per se treatment is appropriate
‘[o]nce experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it.’ ” (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med.
Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982))).
171. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 892.
172. See Benjamin Klein, Competitive Resale Price Maintenance in the Absence of Free
Riding, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 431, 442 (2009).
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B. The Absence of Empirical Evidence Demonstrating that Minimum
RPM Produces Significant Benefits Does Not Undermine Leegin
Many scholars and officials have asserted there is not substantial
empirical evidence supporting the claim that minimum RPM produces benefits in a significant number of cases, with the result that Congress and/or the states should reinstate Dr. Miles.173 However, it is
not clear why proponents of Leegin should bear the burden of proving
that minimum RPM produces benefits. While certain restraints are
unreasonable per se, such summary condemnation is the rare exception, not the rule.174 Private contracts are presumptively reasonable,
and parties seeking to void such contracts must ordinarily prove that
such agreements produce harm.175 Finally, modern courts only condemn a category of restraints as unlawful per se if experience with
rule of reason scrutiny teaches that full-blown scrutiny will always or
almost always condemn the restraint.176 Thus, if courts were writing
on a “clean slate,” it would seem appropriate to cast the burden of
proof upon those who would condemn all minimum RPM agreements,
no matter the market position of the parties, as unlawful per se.177
Of course, courts are not writing on a clean slate; Dr. Miles was on
the books (with substantial exceptions and qualifications) for nearly
a century before Leegin. But this fact cuts in Leegin’s favor. After all,

173. See, e.g., Leegin Senate Judiciary Hearing, supra note 149, at 6 (statement of
Pamela Jones Harbour, Comm’r, FTC, commenting that “[t]here still is no body of sound
empirical economic evidence to show that minimum vertical price fixing is, on balance,
more likely than not to benefit consumers”); id. at 7 (statement of Robert Pitofsky) (“It is 95
years later, and they still have not come up with an iota of data, of empirical support, that
free riders drive services out of the market, that manufacturers introduce minimum resale
price maintenance in order to attract services. It is all Economics 101 theory.”); Lao, supra
note 164, at 82-83 (asserting that “there is little reliable empirical evidence” regarding the
impact of minimum RPM); Letter from 41 Attorneys General, supra note 149, at 1 (“[W]e
are not aware of any empirical study that shows enhanced consumer welfare in the form of
services or other customer benefits. Sufficient experience with state ‘fair trade laws’ during
the middle of the last century evidenced that consumers paid significantly more for goods
when manufacturers could maintain prices at the retail level.”). One scholar, it should be
noted, takes a more nuanced position, contending that the absence of such evidence is one
factor that should cause courts to reject a “full blown” rule of reason in favor of a more hostile “quick look” approach, under which such restraints are automatically presumed unlawful, thereby casting upon the defendant a burden of producing evidence that the restraint
produces significant benefits. See Lao, supra note 164, at 85 (contending that “quick look”
treatment is appropriate “given the absence of reliable empirical evidence on the prevalence and significance of RPM’s procompetitive effects”).
174. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977).
175. See, e.g., Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 507 (2d Cir.
2004) (explaining that proof of actual harm is the first step in an ordinary rule of reason
case).
176. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
177. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988) (“[In Sylvania]
[w]e noted that especially in the vertical restraint context ‘departure from the rule-ofreason standard must be based on demonstrable economic effect, rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing.’ ” (quoting Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58-59)).
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Dr. Miles (which itself invoked no empirical evidence), rested upon
the purely theoretical claim that minimum RPM was indistinguishable in economic effect from a horizontal dealer cartel, that is, could
not further any procompetitive interest, a position that numerous
price theorists embraced during the inhospitality era.178 Such logic, of
course, applied with equal force to non-price restraints, impelling the
Schwinn Court to condemn such agreements, as well.179
TCE, of course, completely undermines the theoretical equation of
vertical restraints with analogous naked horizontal restraints. Without this purely theoretical premise, the logic of Dr. Miles collapses,
thereby mandating rule of reason treatment for such restraints, unless proponents of per se condemnation carry their burden of establishing the sort of “demonstrable economic effect” necessary to justify
per se condemnation.180 To be sure, those who resist Leegin have attempted to make this case. They point out that minimum RPM reduces price competition (undeniably true—that’s the point), thereby
satisfying the first part of the per se rule’s two-part test.181 Moreover,
Leegin’s detractors have repeatedly invoked experience with the fair
trade era, during which Dr. Miles was only applicable in a fraction of
the country.182 Despite this experience with widespread fair trade,
Leegin’s detractors say, there is no evidence that minimum
RPM overcame free riding or otherwise furthered the interests
of consumers.183
However, proponents of Dr. Miles are too quick to treat the fair
trade era as a source of data relevant to an evaluation of Leegin’s rule
of reason. For one thing, the fair trade regime was more permissive
of RPM than any full-blown rule of reason. As explained earlier,
178. See Edward S. Herman, A Note on Fair Trade, 65 YALE L.J. 23, 23-24 (1955) (reporting that economists were in “virtually unanimous agreement” that “ ‘fair trade . . . in
practical effect . . . nullifies the antitrust prohibitions against horizontal price fixing’ ” (citation omitted)); id. at 24 n.6 (collecting authorities for this proposition). See also supra
note 32 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (describing Schwinn’s reliance upon
Dr. Miles).
180. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889 (2007)
(failure of Dr. Miles’s main rationale requires reexamination of the economic foundations of
the per se rule); Business Electronics, 485 U.S. at 724 (per se condemnation depends upon
demonstrated economic effect).
181. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (articulating a two-part
test for per se condemnation).
182. See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
183. See Harbour Testimony 2009, supra note 149, at 4-5 (invoking 1975 Congressional
findings based on experience during the fair trade era to support legislative reversal of
Leegin); Letter from 41 Attorneys General, supra note 149, at 1-2; Robert Pitofsky, Are Retailers Who Offer Discounts Really “Knaves”?: The Coming Challenge to the Dr. Miles Rule,
21 ANTITRUST 61, 62-63 (2007) (invoking fair trade experience in support of Dr. Miles). See
also Edward D. Cavanagh, Vertical Price Restraints After Leegin, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 1, 22-23 (2008) (contending that during the fair trade era, minimum RPM occurred in
some industries in which conditions for dealer free riding were not present).
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many fair trade laws authorized manufacturers to compel dealers to
accept minimum RPM against their will. 184 An era that includes numerous agreements coercively imposed on unwilling retailers is not a
useful source of data for evaluating the hypothesis that such agreements are voluntary integration designed to overcome market failure
and reduce transaction costs.185
More fundamentally, application of fair trade immunity did not
turn on the presence or not of free riding or any other putative benefits of minimum RPM. Instead, under Miller-Tydings, states could
immunize minimum RPM whenever: (1) the agreements were vertical, and (2) there was “free and open competition”—what today we
would call interbrand competition—between the manufacturer’s
product and other goods.186 Absent such interbrand competition,
states could not immunize minimum RPM, regardless of whether
such restraints produced benefits. 187 Moreover, so long as there was
such (apparent) competition—a condition courts almost always
found—the presence of anticompetitive harm did not obviate fair
trade immunity, even when minimum RPM was adopted throughout
the industry.188 In these circumstances, firms could enter minimum
RPM agreements, even agreements that would produce economic
harm and fail Leegin’s rule of reason, with impunity, undeterred by
any rule of reason scrutiny. 189

184. See Bates, supra note 44, at 134 (reporting that ten state supreme courts had
found non-signer provisions unconstitutional). See also supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 313-14 (1956)
(applying language in the Miller-Tydings Act providing that states could not confer fair
trade immunity on horizontal agreements).
187. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 158 F.2d 592, 593-94 (2d Cir. 1946) (rejecting manufacturer’s invocation of fair trade immunity because black and white film was not
a substitute for defendant’s color film, with the result that the defendant possessed a monopoly such that there was no “free and open competition” between the manufacturer’s
product and others). Cf. Columbia Records Inc. v. Goody, 105 N.Y.S.2d 659, 663 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1951) (finding that products were in “fair and open competition” for purpose of exemption provided under state law).
188. See, e.g., Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Econ. Sales Co., 127 F. Supp. 739 (D.
Conn. 1954) (fair trade exemption applied even if dealer proved that defendant and sole
rival charged identical prices to dealers); 1947 FTC ANN. REP. 60 (1947) (reporting that
after Eastman Kodak, 158 F.2d at 593-94, the Commission modified its original order invalidating minimum RPM upon finding that “free and open competition” was present after
one firm entered a previously-monopolized market). See also Herman, supra note 178, at
25-26 (noting that Eastman Kodak was the only decision holding that there was insufficient competition to invoke the fair trade exemption).
189. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Alameda Cnty., 291 P.2d 945 (1955) (rejecting
dealer’s argument that manufacturer’s excessive profits despite free and open competition
would undermine the application of fair trade law). See infra notes 298-302 and accompanying text (detailing the conditions under which minimum RPM would fail rule of reason
scrutiny).
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As a result, the universe of minimum RPM agreements that arose
under a fair trade regime differed from that which will likely arise
under a post-Leegin rule of reason. That is, the ratio of anticompetitive to procompetitive agreements was likely higher during the fair
trade era than it will be post-Leegin. Moreover, during the fair trade
era, parties to litigation over the application or not of state fair trade
statutes had no reason to generate evidence about the benefits of
such practices or whether such benefits might outweigh harms.190
While Congress repealed the fair trade laws in 1975, doing so merely
reinstated Dr. Miles, which banned minimum RPM, without regard
to whether such agreements produced benefits.191 As a result, minimum RPM litigation focused on other issues, such as whether there
was actually an agreement between a manufacturer and its dealers,
whether that agreement really “fixed prices,” and whether title to the
relevant product had in fact passed to the dealer.192
In any event, even if fair trade regimes had treated the benefits of
minimum RPM as pertinent, parties would have had little reason to
investigate whether such agreements reduced free riding. Simply
put, for most of the fair trade era, the notion of private agreements
overcoming market failure and thus producing non-technological efficiencies was foreign to the economics profession and, thus, to members of the bar and legal academy who relied upon economic theory to
inform antitrust analysis. The perfect competition model, with its
numerous heroic assumptions, had a strong grip on those who applied economics to antitrust. 193 To be sure, price theorists recognized
that not all markets are perfectly competitive. Moreover, many such
theorists studied the impact of monopoly, oligopoly, and/or monopolistic competition. 194 Still, while these scholars recognized that some
markets could be characterized by fewer sellers than necessary for
190. See infra notes 275-80 and accompanying text (elaborating on the role of proof of
benefits in overall rule of reason analysis).
191. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (detailing the repeal of fair trade
laws).
192. See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726-28 (1988) (articulating the definition of “price fixing” relevant for application of Dr. Miles); Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 760-61 (1984) (articulating the standards governing whether manufacturer and dealers had entered a price agreement); Morrison v.
Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1436 (7th Cir. 1986) (articulating the standard for distinguishing bona fide agency agreements from sham consignment designed solely to
achieve RPM). See also United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380-81
(1967) (holding that territorial restraints accomplished via consignment arrangements are
analyzed under the rule of reason).
193. See generally FRANK M. MACHOVEC, PERFECT COMPETITION AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF ECONOMICS (1995) (describing the evolution of classical economics
and the perfect competition model).
194. See generally EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
(1933); JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933). See also Joe
S. Bain, Market Classifications in Modern Price Theory, 56 Q.J. ECON. 560, 569-74 (1942)
(offering detailed taxonomy of various market structures).
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perfect competition, they nonetheless generally retained most other
assumptions of perfect competition when analyzing such markets.195
As I have shown elsewhere, rigorous embrace of some such assumptions simply precluded recognition that reliance on atomized markets
could produce market failure and/or that private agreements could
overcome this condition. 196 Moreover, economists and then legal
scholars did not introduce the argument that minimum RPM could
reduce free riding until 1960, the same year (coincidentally?) that
Ronald Coase first contended that parties could, by contract, reallocate legal entitlements in a way that eliminates antecedent market
failure. 197 Thus, while minimum RPM thrived during the fair trade
era, economists, legal scholars, and members of the antitrust bar had
no reason to examine whether this practice was a voluntary contractual mechanism for overcoming market failure. Like other scientists,
economists do not gather facts in a vacuum, but instead must rely
upon some theory to inform the contours of factual inquiry.198 Given
the state of economic theory and legal rules during most of the fair
trade era, economists and others had no reason to ask whether open,
notorious, and lawful minimum RPM reduced free riding or otherwise overcame some market failure. Pre-modern astronomers may
just as well have studied the exact contours of a (stationary) Earth’s
“orbit” around the Sun.
To be sure, some early practitioners of TCE, notably Robert Bork
and Lester Telser, embraced transaction cost reasoning during the
1960s, but these scholars were a decided minority. Even Donald
Turner and Richard Posner, one an economist and the other an economically sophisticated antitrust lawyer, rejected the Telser-Bork
view and co-authored the brief that convinced the Supreme Court to
extend Dr. Miles and declare non-price post-sale restraints unlawful

195. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, The Meaning of Competition, in INDIVIDUALISM AND
ECONOMIC ORDER 92, 94 (1948) (“Most [assumptions of perfect competition] are equally
assumed in the discussion of the various ‘imperfect’ or ‘monopolistic’ markets, which
throughout assume certain unrealistic ‘perfections.’ ”). See also CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F.
TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 8 (1959) (“[T]hough the
model of [perfectly] competitive market structure is not usable as such in our definition of
competition, other concepts of the model are.”); Meese, supra note 89, at 469 & n.47 (collecting various authorities to this effect).
196. See Meese, supra note 50, at 70-80.
197. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Telser, supra
note 72. See also supra notes 72-88 and accompanying text (detailing the evolution of TCE,
beginning with Telser’s assertion that minimum RPM could overcome market failure).
198. See KUHN, supra note 96, at 59-61 (explaining that background expectations driven by theory limit the type of data that a scientist may find); KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC
OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 107 (5th ed. 1968) (“Theory dominates the experimental work
from its initial planning up to the finishing touches in the laboratory.”); Ronald H. Coase,
The New Institutional Economics, 140 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 229 (1984)
(chiding institutional economists for gathering a mass of facts with no theory to guide them
as to what was relevant).
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per se in Schwinn. 199 A 1968 article by an economist in the Harvard
Law Review on vertical intrabrand restraints did not mention
Telser’s work on minimum RPM and argued that courts should condemn all such restraints, even those imposed pursuant to a consignment arrangement.200 The piece devoted three paragraphs to a rejection of the “free rider” argument propounded earlier in the decade by
Bork, claiming that such promotion would lead to product differentiation and that, if consumers really valued such services, a separate
market would spring up to supply them. 201
Thus, TCE did not really take root until the mid-1970s, just as
Congress repealed the fair trade laws and restored Dr. Miles by default.202 In so doing, Congress quite ironically created a legal regime
that deprived the antitrust community of the very data Leegin’s detractors claim they crave. After all, per se condemnation drives certain restraints underground, depriving scholars of the sort of judicial
records that inform empirical investigation.203 By banning all minimum RPM, then, Dr. Miles itself prevented economists from gathering data about the true impact of minimum RPM, just as they were
learning what to look for. Calls for more data ring hollow coming
from those who support the very legal regime that prevents the acquisition of such information. If more knowledge is what we want,
full-blown rule of reason scrutiny is the best way to get it. But until
then, proponents of Dr. Miles have simply not carried their burden
of articulating and empirically supporting a rationale for per
se condemnation.
In any event, the absence of empirical evidence has never precluded courts from adjusting rules governing restraints of trade. For instance, in the early fifteenth century, English courts condemned all
trade restraints outright, without regard to reasonableness. 204 Three
centuries later, these courts reversed course, announcing they would
199. See Williamson, supra note 53, at 64 (describing the roles of Posner and Turner in
preparing the government’s Schwinn brief). As explained earlier, Williamson objected to
the brief at the time. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
200. See Comanor, supra note 50, at 1432-33 (1968).
201. Id. at 1433.
202. See supra note 103 (collecting authorities applying TCE reasoning to vertical restraints in the 1970s).
203. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, at 536 (arguing that courts should examine minimum RPM under the rule of reason in part because “[b]oth legal policy makers and economists learn a great deal from studying the records of business litigation”); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1984) (“Once a practice has
been declared unlawful, a business is likely to defend a lawsuit by denying that it engaged
in the practice. Rarely will it say: ‘Yes, we did that, and here is why it is economically beneficial that we did.’ Judges thus are deprived of opportunities to reconsider, with the light of
knowledge, what they decided in ignorance.”).
204. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (“The
inhibition against restraints of trade at common law seems at first to have had no exception.” (citing Dyer’s Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. V, fol. 5, pl. 26 (1414) (Eng.))).
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enforce reasonable, partial ancillary restraints. 205 None of the courts
adduced any empirical evidence in support of its conclusions, which
instead were premised upon theory about the impact of such restraints. The Supreme Court described these developments with approval in Standard Oil, as did William Howard Taft in his foundational Addyston Pipe opinion. 206 In the same way, nineteenth-century
American courts repeatedly emphasized that the common law of
trade restraints was not static, but instead responsive to judicial reappraisal in light of what Standard Oil would later call “more accurate economic conceptions.” 207
The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that Congress expected courts to draw upon “common law tradition” when implementing the Sherman Act. 208 This tradition, of course, included the authority of courts to fashion antitrust doctrine without waiting for
empirical evidence, especially when judge-created doctrines have
themselves precluded the acquisition of such evidence! Presumably
Congress had these decisions and their common law methodology in
mind when it adopted a term—“restraint of trade”—laden with common law meaning and such “dynamic potential.”209
It should come as no surprise, then, that the Supreme Court has
itself repeatedly rejected or mandated per se condemnation without
empirical evidence supporting its conclusions. At one time, for instance, tying agreements were subject to a forgiving rule of reason,
under which defendants could articulate benefits that justified such

205. See Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711). See also Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at
280-81 (discussing these developments).
206. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51 (1911) (“Originally all such contracts were considered to be illegal, because it was deemed they were injurious to the public as well as to the individuals who made them. In the interest of the freedom of individuals to contract this doctrine was modified . . . .”); Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 280 (describing
various policy considerations that led English and then American courts to abandon an
outright ban on trade restraints).
207. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 55; Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 280-81 (describing
American developments). See also Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889) (“The
decision in Mitchel v. Reynolds is the foundation of the rule in relation to the invalidity of
contracts in restraint of trade; but as it was made under a condition of things, and a state
of society, different from those which now prevail, the rule laid down is not regarded as inflexible, and has been considerably modified.” (citations omitted)). See also infra note 345
and accompanying text (collecting state decisions to the same effect).
208. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (“[Congress] expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on
common-law tradition. The Rule of Reason, with its origins in common-law precedents long
antedating the Sherman Act, has served that purpose. It has been used to give the Act both
flexibility and definition, and its central principle of antitrust analysis has remained constant.”).
209. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1998) (“The Sherman
Act adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’ along with its dynamic potential. It invokes the
common law itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to
the term in 1890.”).
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practices. 210 After World War II, however, the Court declared in dicta
that “[t]ying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition” and opined that there were almost always
less restrictive alternatives that would achieve the same objective as
such arrangements. 211 The Court cited no empirical evidence, citing
instead a law review note and a monograph authored by a price theorist. 212 The note cited only the same monograph for its conclusion.213
Despite this flimsy foundation, the Court repeated this nostrum for
decades. 214 As a result, the Court declared unlawful per se any tying
contract entered by a firm with economic power, reasoning that all
such ties were necessarily the result of power used to impose them.215
The Court found such power in any departure from perfect competition, even asserting that the very imposition of a tie itself established
that the defendant had economic power.216 Here again the Court offered no empirical evidence supporting its assertion that ties obtained by firms not in perfect competition were the result of market
power. Nor did the Court offer any empirical support for subsequent
adjustments in tying doctrine, including its redefinition of the type and
quantum of economic power necessary to establish a per se violation. 217
The Court’s approach to non-price vertical restraints has been
equally untethered to empirical support. The Schwinn Court, for in210. See FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920) (declining to ban tying contracts); Pick Mfg.
Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), aff'd per curiam, 299 U.S. 3 (1936)
(sustaining a tie because the requirement could protect the manufacturer’s goodwill).
211. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949) (“Tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition. The justification
most often advanced in their defense—the protection of the good will of the manufacturer
of the tying device—fails in the usual situation because specification of the type and quality of the product to be used in connection with the tying device is protection enough.”) This
language was dicta because the Court was in fact evaluating an exclusive dealing contract
between a gasoline refiner and its dealers.
212. Id. at 306 (citing MILLER, supra note 50, at 199; Note, Section 3 of the Clayton
Act—Coexisting Standards of Legality?, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 241, 246 (1949)).
213. See Note, supra note 212, at 246 n.40 (citing MILLER, supra note 50, at 199).
214. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Fortner I), 394 U.S. 495 (1969); N.
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958); Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
215. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14-16 (1984); Fortner I,
394 U.S. at 503-04.
216. See Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 503-04 (stating that the ability to impose a tie on an appreciable number of buyers suggests that the seller has economic power); United States v.
Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 52 (1962) (holding that the possession of a copyright confers economic power for purposes of tying doctrine). See also Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448
F.2d 43, 49 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that a trademark conferred economic power for purposes of the per se rule).
217. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 26-29 (holding that a market share of thirty percent did not establish economic power for purposes of the per se rule despite product differentiation). See also Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 705 (7th
Cir. 1984) (explaining that Jefferson Parish’s approach to defining economic power
“doom[ed] the franchise trademark [tying] cases” that had treated any departure from perfect competition as sufficient to establish such power).
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stance, offered no empirical evidence supporting the distinction it
drew between sale and non-sale transactions. 218 The best that can be
said for the decision is that it reflected the consensus economic theory
of the time, which posited a distinction between agreements that
reached beyond a firm and influenced the behavior of purchasers or
suppliers, and those that controlled a firm’s own property before title
passed.219 The former, courts and scholars said, had market power origins, while the latter could produce technological efficiencies. 220
A decade later, the Court, influenced by the teachings of TCE, rejected this distinction, pointing out, properly, that there was no economic rationale for treating the choice between consignment and sale
as dispositive, with the result that the same legal standard should
apply to both transactional forms.221 Yet, a desire for a consistent rule
did not thereby establish the content of that rule; the Court could
have chosen per se condemnation for both transactional forms (as the
United States had sought in Schwinn) or, instead, rule of reason
treatment for both. 222 The Court famously chose the latter course, in
a result that many detractors of Leegin endorse. 223 However, the
Court offered no empirical evidence that a substantial proportion of
non-price vertical restraints in fact produce the sort of benefits that
the Court invoked.224
Still, the mere fact that these various developments lacked empirical bases does not thereby condemn them. Supreme Court justices
are not well-positioned to second-guess a scientific consensus. Bans
on tying, minimum RPM, and other non-standard contracts reflected
the mainstream view within the economics profession, driven by
price theory, that such agreements could not produce benefits. This
consensus informed the “reason” that Section 1 requires courts to

218. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 377-83 (1967).
219. See Meese, Intrabrand Restraints, supra note 51, at 38-49 (explaining price theory’s conclusion that restraints purporting to control purchasers after passage of title could
not produce efficiencies and therefore had market power origins). See also supra notes 5364 and accompanying text.
220. See Meese, Intrabrand Restraints, supra note 51, at 42-44.
221. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977). Cf. Bork,
Price Fixing, supra note 77, at 472 (“In economic analysis, a contract integration is as much
a firm as an ownership integration. The nature of the standards applied to them through
the Sherman Act should be the same.” (citing Coase, supra note 65, at 381)).
222. See, e.g., Comanor, supra note 50, at 1433-35 (advocating a per se ban on all such
agreements, regardless whether title had passed).
223. See, e.g., Warren S. Grimes, The Path Forward After Leegin: Seeking Consensus
Reform of the Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 467, 471 (2008) (expressing agreement with Sylvania’s rule of reason holding).
224. The Sylvania Court did refer to unspecified “decision[s] sustaining vertical restrictions under the rule of reason” as evidence that such restraints produce “redeeming
virtues.” See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54. The absence of any citation of such cases or explanation of the test these courts employed makes it difficult to evaluate this evidence.
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bring to bear on antitrust problems.225 The very same sort of consensus still drives the Court’s per se ban on naked horizontal price fixing, a ban not found in pre-Sherman Act common law.226 No Supreme
Court decision invokes empirical evidence that such price fixing produces harm; the case is purely theoretical and, so far as we know, correct.
In any event, the demand for empirical evidence by Leegin’s detractors is difficult to square with their continuing support for Dr.
Miles. That decision, after all, rested upon the purely theoretical conclusion—now known to be false—that minimum RPM is analogous to
a dealer cartel. 227 Absent a “demonstrable showing” that minimum
RPM nonetheless satisfies the criteria for per se treatment, a showing
Leegin’s detractors have not made, continued resistance to Leegin
constitutes a rejection of TCE and/or a rejection of basic antitrust
principles, such as the two-part test for per se illegality.
C. The Purported Availability of So-Called “Less Restrictive
Alternatives” Does Not Undermine Leegin
Proponents of per se condemnation frequently contend that manufacturers can achieve RPM’s legitimate objectives by so-called “less
restrictive alternatives,” that is, practices that combat dealer free riding or achieve other objectives without setting resale prices. For instance, one scholar claims that manufacturers can instead design and
pay for advertising themselves, or provide promotional allowances to
dealers that do advertise. 228 Failing this, he says, manufacturers can
rely upon non-price restraints such as territorial restraints that
“close[]” distribution and thus encourage dealer promotion.229 Twenty-seven states and some scholars have even argued that manufacturers can simply stipulate by contract the type of promotion desired
and pay dealers separately for it. 230
225. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
226. See FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 23-24 (1990) (articulating a per se ban on price fixing regardless of reasonableness); HOVENKAMP, supra note 16,
at 63-64 (explaining that pre-Sherman Act common law enforced horizontal agreements
setting reasonable prices); id. at 178-79 (detailing the economic rationale for a ban on price
fixing).
227. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
228. See Grimes, supra note 223, at 491-94.
229. Id. at 492-93.
230. See Amended States’ Comments Urging Denial of Nine West’s Petition at 9, In re
Nine W. Grp., Inc., No. C-3937 (F.T.C. Jan. 18, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/comments/ninewestgrp.080117statesamendedcomments.pdf (“The manufacturer could
require its distributors to provide services as a matter of contract and even pay separately
for those services. In that circumstance, the manufacturer could terminate or threaten to
terminate the relationship if the retailer did not live up to those obligations. That alternative way of fostering services for consumers is more effective and efficient than [minimum
RPM].”); Cavanagh, supra note 183, at 22-23 (identifying separate contracting as a less restrictive alternative); Kirkwood, supra note 155, at 445 (“The most obvious [less restrictive
alternative] is simply to require dealers, as a condition of retaining their dealerships, to
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The universal or near-universal presence of such alternatives can
bolster the case for per se illegality, by suggesting that defendants
can always achieve the benefits achieved via minimum RPM while
allowing dealers at least nominal pricing discretion. 231 One could argue that the widespread availability of such alternatives signals that
“rule of reason [analysis] will [always] condemn” minimum RPM,
thereby justifying per se condemnation.232
The invocation of less restrictive alternatives to justify per se condemnation of minimum RPM is not new. Price theorists hostile to
non-standard agreements have been making this argument for decades. Indeed, ironically, many once invoked the prospect of less restrictive alternatives to justify per se condemnation of various nonprice restraints of the sort that some of Leegin’s detractors now invoke as alternatives for minimum RPM. For instance, Donald Turner
once argued that exclusive territories should be unlawful per se, given the purported presence of less restrictive alternatives.233 He had
previously made the same argument with respect to tying contracts. 234 Derek Bok, then a colleague of Turner’s at Harvard Law
School, argued that less restrictive alternatives would satisfy any le-

provide the desired services.”); Pitofsky, supra note 183, at 63 (“[I]f the manufacturer really
has in mind particular services, the common commercial practice is to contract separately
for them with the retailer, i.e., advertising support, warranty programs, and so forth.
Those opposing per se rules in this area implicitly assume that the manufacturer knows
better than the retailer or the market what will or will not work in the marketplace.”).
231. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 25 n.42 (1984) (invoking the availability of purportedly less restrictive alternatives as a rationale for the per
se rule); Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969) (same); Turner,
Tying Arrangements, supra note 50, at 59-60 (same). See also Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets
the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
71-72 (1997) (describing so-called “categorical balancing” whereby the supposed presence of
less restrictive alternatives justifies a per se ban on tying contracts, even though such contracts sometimes produce benefits).
232. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (opining that “[p]er se treatment is
appropriate” when courts are confident that rule of reason scrutiny of restraints in question will result in condemnation) (citations omitted). Such an argument would depend upon
the methodology for establishing a prima facie case, however. For instance, if courts
deemed such restraints “inherently suspect,” such that the mere existence of such agreements established a prima facie case, then one could predict that rule of reason analysis
would always condemn them. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769-70 (1999)
(opining that certain restraints are inherently anticompetitive and thus presumptively unreasonable). If instead courts required plaintiffs to prove actual anticompetitive harm to
establish a prima facie case, it would be more difficult to conclude that rule of reason analysis will always or almost always condemn such agreements.
233. See Turner, Conscious Parallelism, supra note 50, at 699 (explaining that the requirement that the dealer use its best efforts within an area of “primary responsibility” will
assure effective promotion by dealers). See also Christopher D. Stone, Closed Territorial
Distribution: An Opening Question in the Sherman Act, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 286, 313-14
(1963) (contending that less restrictive alternatives would achieve the same objective and
thus widen distribution of goods and reduce prices).
234. Turner, Tying Arrangements, supra note 50, at 59-60.
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gitimate objectives of exclusive dealing agreements.235 Subsequently,
scholars contended that there were less restrictive means of achieving the legitimate objectives of location clauses or horizontal allocations of territories ancillary to a wealth-producing joint venture.236
For almost as long, however, proponents of TCE have been offering rebuttals of such arguments. These rebuttals confirm that support for less restrictive alternatives depends upon outmoded pricetheoretic assumptions, a misunderstanding of TCE’s rationales for
vertical restraints, or both. For instance, more than four decades before Leegin, Robert Bork responded to the claim that manufacturers
could achieve the same benefits as exclusive territories by adopting
so-called “areas of primary responsibility.”237 Such provisions would
require dealers to promote optimally the manufacturer’s product
within a certain territory, but without preventing dealers from also
serving each other’s primary territories.238 Bork admitted that such
provisions could, in theory, achieve the same promotional investments as an exclusive territory.239 At the same time, he rebutted the
claim that such alternatives would work in the real world. His rebuttal, which rests upon transaction cost considerations, is worth quoting at length.
The area-of-primary-responsibility clause . . . permits selling
across territorial lines and thereby makes it less profitable for resellers to engage in local sales effort. The resellers’ interests then
diverge from the manufacturer’s. The manufacturer must, therefore, know what degree of local sales effort is optimal in each reseller’s territory and must assiduously police each reseller to see
that he expends, against his own interest, the effort desired. This
solution is obviously not satisfactory.
It would be extraordinarily costly for the manufacturer to
learn at first hand the real sales potential of every dealer’s area
and just how and where each dealer’s sales effort should be ex-

235. Bok, supra note 50, at 307-08 (concluding that parties could always achieve legitimate objectives of exclusive dealing contracts by simply terminating shirking dealers).
236. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 48-49, Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977) (No. 76-15) (contending that less restrictive means would produce the same
benefits as location clauses); SULLIVAN, supra note 42, at 386 (same); Robert Pitofsky, A
Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 893, 911-12 (1985)
(contending that less restrictive alternatives could produce same benefits as horizontal ancillary exclusive territories).
237. See Bork, Price Fixing, supra note 77, at 465-69. See also White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 270-72 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (offering this alternative to
exclusive territories); United States v. Philco Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68,409, at
71,753 (E.D. Pa. 1956) (approving a consent decree permitting areas of primary responsibility as an alternative to exclusive territories).
238. See Bork, Price Fixing, supra note 77, at 467-68 (describing the operation of such
provisions).
239. Id. at 467 (“Such clauses do, however, permit the manufacturer to demand of the
dealer the amount of local sales effort which the manufacturer considers optimum.”).
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pended. Since the dealer who is required to undertake unremunerative tasks can hardly be relied upon to identify all such tasks so
that they may be imposed upon him, the manufacturer will have to
integrate partially into the dealer level to make the survey the
dealer is not motivated to make. This survey, moreover, cannot be
made once for all time. Changes in population, income, tastes,
products, and other factors will continually alter sales potential.
The manufacturer will, therefore, have to be in as constant contact
with local markets as all of his dealers combined. This procedure is
probably so costly in most cases that the manufacturer will not do
the job completely. Instead, he will rely upon inaccurate indicia
such as whether the dealer comes up to the dealer average in sales
to areas containing similar populations. . . . Market division, which
gives each dealer the incentive to cultivate his area as intensively
as is worthwhile from the point of both the dealer and the manufacturer, eliminates all the extra costs and inaccuracies of an attempt to enforce an area-of-primary-responsibility clause.240

In short, the “primary responsibility” approach would be a perfect
alternative in a price-theoretic world, where manufacturers could
costlessly gather information about the preferences of consumers,
costlessly determine appropriate promotional strategies for each territory, costlessly communicate those strategies to dealers, and then
costlessly monitor whether, in fact, dealers complied with these directives. However, as Bork implicitly realized, the real world is beset
with numerous types of information costs, costs that would make
such a strategy a non-starter. By contrast, exclusive territories would
allow manufacturers to avoid such costs while at the same time harnessing the expertise of local dealers, who presumably know far more
about local preferences and how to tailor appropriate promotional
strategies than a functionary at corporate headquarters. As Bork
would expressly note in a subsequent article, exclusive territories
and minimum RPM, while granted by contract, can function as the
economic equivalent of property rights, ensuring that dealers internalize the full costs and benefits of their promotional activities and
thereby aligning dealers and manufacturers’ incentives.241

240. Id. at 468.
241. See Bork, Resale Price Maintenance, supra note 77, at 956 (“R.p.m., like vertical
market division, is the means by which the manufacturer induces reseller provision of [information] by making sure that the reseller can recover the [information’s] cost. The process is closely analogous to the social recognition of property rights as a means of inducing
economic activities. Contract law delegates to private persons the power to create property
rights because of their superior knowledge of the efficiencies to be gained in particular situations. R.p.m. is best viewed as an instance of this general principle. The net effect of
r.p.m. is to increase the amount of an existing product (or, more accurately, to enlarge the
information component, for example, of a composite product consisting of a physical item
and information about the item) which is offered to consumers.”). See also Marvel, supra
note 137, at 2-4; Meese, supra note 137, at 600-07.
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Similar considerations require rejection of the claim by Leegin’s
detractors that less restrictive alternatives will serve the same objective as minimum RPM. Consider, for instance, the most prevalent
claim, namely, that manufacturers can simply contract for the type of
promotional services they desire, an alternative that opponents of
various vertical restraints have been advancing for decades.242 As
Bork and other scholars have explained, this approach would make
perfect sense if the cost of bargaining and acquiring information was
zero, as the perfect competition model assumes.243 In this case, manufacturers could readily ascertain just how susceptible each dealer’s
customers were to various forms of promotion, tailor a promotional
strategy for each dealer, and then (costlessly) negotiate contracts obligating each dealer to engage in optimal promotion, at whatever
price the parties (costlessly) agree to. Manufacturers would then
(costlessly) monitor each dealer, terminating dealers who did not
comply. But of course, as TCE taught us, bargaining and information
costs are not zero, but instead can be quite significant, particularly in
franchisor-franchisee relationships. Relegating manufacturers to
these alternatives will increase the cost of distribution and/or reduce
the effectiveness of promotion.
More fundamentally, most arguments for less restrictive alternatives misconceive the nature of the interest served by minimum RPM
and, for that matter, exclusive territories. Take again the claim that
manufacturers can simply tell dealers how, when, and where to promote the manufacturer’s product and then terminate those dealers
that do not comply.244 Invocation of this alternative sets up manufacturers as central planners, who know the exact promotional strategy
that each dealer should employ. However, if manufacturers believed
themselves capable of such planning, they could take on the task of
distribution themselves, determining optimal promotional strategies
and directing employee-dealers to execute such strategies. As TCE
has taught us, a manufacturer’s decision to rely upon the market to
accomplish a particular task is not exogenous, but depends upon the
242. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (describing this view by several of
Leegin’s detractors).
243. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 48, at 187 (contending that less restrictive alternatives often increase the cost of policing and preventing dealer opportunism). See also Bork,
Price Fixing, supra note 77, at 467-68; Howard P. Marvel, The Resale Price Maintenance
Controversy: Beyond the Conventional Wisdom, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 59, 78 (1994) (“The question, however, is not whether alternatives exist but whether they are superior to the vertical restraints they replace, either from the standpoint of economic efficiency or of competition. This is not an easy standard to meet . . . .”); Meese, supra note 137, at 589-92
(explaining how manufacturers rely on dealers because the cost of planning promotional
decisions is prohibitively high, contrary to the assumptions of price theory).
244. See supra note 230 (collecting scholarly authorities asserting that such supervision of dealers’ promotional decisions is a less restrictive means of assuring appropriate
promotion).
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relative cost of such reliance, on the one hand, and the alternative of
complete vertical integration, on the other.245 Manufacturers who
adopt minimum RPM have by hypothesis chosen to rely upon independent dealers to distribute their products, presumably because
they do not want to take on the task of making promotional decisions
for each and every location where the manufacturer’s product is
sold.246 Unlike employees, who presumably earn fixed wages, such
dealers can earn a profit and thus can at least potentially capture the
full benefits of any promotional investment they make.247 By relying
upon the market to distribute their products, manufacturers can entrust promotional determinations to independent for-profit dealers
with both the incentive and local knowledge to discover optimal promotional tactics.248 Armed with this discretion, different dealers
might employ different strategies, depending upon the nature of the
local consumer population and the myriad of evolving factors that
Bork identified.249 For instance, a dealer in a locality full of retirees
might rely heavily on newspaper and radio advertisements. A dealer
in a locality with a young population might rely on social media and
other forms of internet advertising. A dealer in a college town may
vary its strategy depending upon whether school is in session.
A manufacturer can perfect this decentralized and dealer-centric
system of distribution by employing minimum RPM to confer upon
dealers the equivalent of a property right in the fruits of their promotional efforts.250 That is, by assigning individuals ownership in the
fruits of their investments, this contractual property can transform a
public good—promotional information—into a private good and
thereby ensure optimal provision.251 The alternative of reliance upon
manufacturer planning and resulting payment for promotional ser-

245. See Coase, supra note 65, passim.
246. See Meese, supra note 137, at 589-92.
247. Id. at 590-91.
248. Id. at 595-98.
249. See Bork, Price Fixing, supra note 77, at 467-68.
250. See Bork, Resale Price Maintenance, supra note 77, at 956. See also Marvel, supra
note 137, at 2-4; Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L. REV. 143, 193 (1997) [hereinafter Meese, Price Theory and Vertical Restraints] (“[R]eliance upon payments for individual services will attenuate the benefits of a
dealer system of distribution. Presumably, different classes of dealers face customers with
different service needs [and] granting each dealer an exclusive territory would allow for
dealer-by-dealer decision making about the appropriate mix of various presale and postsale
services. . . . [By contrast,] individualized negotiation . . . would eliminate the benefits of
relying upon dealers' judgment as to the appropriate mix of services to provide . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Meese, supra note 137, at 595-98.
251. See Meese, supra note 137, at 600-07. See generally R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in
Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974).
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vices serves an entirely different interest, and one only useful in a
price-theoretic world.252
252. Some of Leegin’s detractors claim that dealers protected by minimum RPM may
choose not to promote the manufacturer’s product, thereby “pocketing” the additional margin between the retail price and the cost of the product. See, e.g., Grimes, supra note 223,
at 477; Kirkwood, supra note 155, at 446-47. Some also contend that dealers may employ
the extra margins to invest in dealer-specific quality improvements instead of promotion.
See id.
The first critique apparently assumes, without justification, that demand for the
manufacturer’s product is exogenous and thus unrelated to promotional investments. In
such circumstances, dealers may well have no reason to promote the manufacturer’s product. If, however, there is stiff interbrand competition, including from vertically integrated
manufacturers, dealers that fail to promote the manufacturer’s product will attract fewer
sales at the stipulated price, so long as dealers of other products are themselves engaging
in promotion or if products sold by those dealers have such a strong enough reputation that
they “sell themselves.” Cf. Telser, supra note 72, at 95 (explaining that, over time, heavilypromoted products may gain sufficient public acceptance to obviate the need for additional
promotion). In such an environment, dealers governed by minimum RPM may have little
choice but to engage in promotion to protect their sales against inroads by interbrand rivals. See Meese, supra note 137, at 617-18 (explaining that product differentiation and resulting consumer demand for a manufacturer’s product is not exogenous but instead depends upon promotion in an environment characterized by interbrand competition).
Indeed, a little game theory will illustrate this point. Assume two sets of dealers, one
set selling Fords and one set selling Toyotas. Assume that both manufacturers adopt minimum RPM as a means of granting their dealers property rights over the results of their
promotional efforts, with the result that dealers only face interbrand competition. Assume
further that, taken together, dealers would (as these critics implicitly assume) maximize
their joint welfare by declining to invest in promotion, but that the Sherman Act forbids
such interbrand collusion. Finally, assume that, if a dealer of one product (say Fords) declines to invest in promotion while the dealer of the other product (say Toyotas) does, the
promoting dealer will gain significant sales at the expense of the non-promoting dealer.
Given these assumptions, we can model dealer decisionmaking with the following
normal form game illustrated by a two-by-two table. There are four possible strategy combinations, each of which provides particular payoffs to each dealer, as illustrated. (The
payoffs for the Ford dealers are the first number in each combination.)
TOYOTA

F
O
R
D

Don’t Promote

Promote

Don’t Promote

50, 50

25, 60

Promote

60, 25

30, 30

As the table shows, the two dealers would maximize their joint welfare by agreeing
not to promote (the upper left-hand cell), reducing their costs and reaping whatever sales
that would nonetheless result, perhaps as a result of the manufacturer’s own promotional
efforts. Absent such an (unlawful) agreement, however, each dealer would have to choose
its promotional strategy without knowledge of the strategy chosen by the other. Moreover,
given the (plausible) payoffs illustrated by this chart, each dealer would have a dominant
strategy, that is, a strategy that maximizes its payoff regardless of whether the rival dealer
chooses to promote or not. In particular, each dealer would have a dominant strategy of
promoting and thus would choose that strategy, leading to a (non-cooperative) Nash equilibrium, the lower right-hand cell on the chart. (The result is a Nash equilibrium because
neither party would gain by choosing a different strategy, given the strategy chosen by the
other.) While the result would not maximize the joint welfare of the dealers, the resulting
increase in sales would presumably increase the welfare of consumers and manufacturers.
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Minimum RPM is not the only method of creating such a property
right. As Bork and others have argued, contractually granted exclusive territories can also create such a right.253 But this does not establish that exclusive territories and minimum RPM are always interchangeable. For instance, in some cases, the nature of the product,
promotional technology, and consumer base might be such that
granting dealers meaningful exclusive territories will result in inadequate promotion. Moreover, granting exclusive territories may actually reduce intrabrand competition more than minimum RPM, as the
latter simply sets a minimum price, while the former grants dealers
local quasi-monopolies that may allow them to price well above the
price that a minimum RPM regime might set. Finally, in some circumstances, manufacturers might find it easier to monitor the price
that a dealer is charging than to determine whether a dealer is advertising or otherwise soliciting customers outside an assigned territory.
It should also be noted that the practical size of an exclusive territory may be exogenous to the distributional needs of manufacturers,
with the result that exclusive territories cannot serve as effective
contractual property rights. Dealers often advertise on local television, radio, and in local newspapers. The coverage of these outlets is
fixed by interaction between the technology of media production and
the nature and dispersion of the local population. In Chicago, for instance, newspaper, radio, and television advertising serves up to 2.7
million individuals.254 It is not clear how a manufacturer could confine a dealer to a geographic subset of this market, given that a radio
advertisement that reaches the South Side will also reach the North
Side and vice versa. Moreover, reliance upon a single dealer to serve
a population so varied and widely dispersed may sacrifice the benefits of localized dealer knowledge that practitioners of TCE have emphasized.255 Finally, dealers may experience diseconomies of scale,
with the result that reliance upon a single dealer will increase the
average cost of distribution. For these and other reasons, a manufacturer may wish to locate more than one dealer in such a locality,

See generally DOUGLAS BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 6-49 (1994) (describing
normal form games and the concept of Nash equilibrium).
The fear that dealers will attempt to attract customers via non-promotional competition does not undermine the claim that minimum RPM will enhance promotion. Manufacturers can simply forbid dealers from engaging in certain forms of non-price rivalry. Moreover, promotional and non-promotional investments are not mutually exclusive; nothing
about minimum RPM, which creates a price floor, prevents dealers from making both sorts
of investments. Indeed, the whole point of contractual property rights is to empower dealers
to attract sales. Manufacturers may be indifferent to how dealers accomplish this objective.
253. See Marvel, supra note 137, at 2; Meese, supra note 137, at 600-02.
254. See State and County Quick Facts: Chicago, Illinois, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17/1714000.html (last updated June 27, 2013, 2:00
PM) (reporting 2012 Chicago metropolitan area population of 2.714 million).
255. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
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thereby rendering reliance upon an exclusive territory impractical
and less effective than minimum RPM.
In sum, the less restrictive alternatives that Leegin’s detractors
have identified are either less effective, more costly, or both. As Oliver Williamson noted long ago, different distributional settings may
pose different problems and thus call for different solutions.256 Scholars and advocates who embrace such alternatives have simply substituted price theory for TCE, thereby rejecting four decades of advances in economic science.
D. Proof that Minimum RPM Resulted in Higher Retail Prices
During the Fair Trade Era Does Not Undermine Leegin
Some who resist Leegin emphasize that minimum RPM results in
higher retail prices than would prevail if the practice were unlawful,
as evidenced by the impact of minimum RPM during the fair trade
era.257 For some, this evidence strengthens the case for per se condemnation.258 For others it supports a hostile “quick look” rule of reason, whereby the mere existence of minimum RPM imposes a burden
on a defendant to prove that the practice produces significant benefits.259 Some of these same advocates treat such evidence as a challenge to proponents of Leegin to adduce evidence that, as a global
matter, the benefits of minimum RPM outweigh its harms.260 In fact,
legislation proposed in 2011 relied in part upon legislative findings
that minimum RPM led to higher prices during the fair trade era and
that post-Leegin minimum RPM will likely increase retail prices.261
This argument is intuitively appealing. After all, Standard Oil’s
rule of reason bans contracts that produce monopoly or its consequences, and the most obvious consequence of monopoly is higher
prices that result from an exercise of market power and concomitant

256. WILLIAMSON, supra note 48, at 48-49.
257. See, e.g., Harbour Testimony 2009, supra note 149, at 4-5 (invoking previous Congressional findings that minimum RPM led to higher retail prices in “fair trade” states);
Letter from 41 State Attorneys General, supra note 149, at 1 (“[E]mpirical studies show
that agreements on minimum resale prices raise consumer prices, often significantly.”);
Kirkwood, supra note 155, at 431-32 (discussing empirical evidence that minimum RPM
increases retail prices); Lao, supra note 164, at 67 (“A troubling fact about RPM is that virtually all studies show it leads to higher consumer prices.”); id. at 67 n.54 (collecting citations of various studies reaching this conclusion).
258. See Harbour Testimony 2009, supra note 149, at 4-7; Letter from 41 State Attorneys General, supra note 149, at 1-2.
259. See Kirkwood, supra note 155, passim; Lao, supra note 164, at 84-85; See also infra Part IX.E (discussing and refuting arguments for such an approach).
260. See Harbour Testimony 2009, supra note 149, at 1 (invoking supposed paucity of
evidence that the benefits of minimum RPM outweigh the harms presumed because of evidence of higher prices); Letter from 41 State Attorneys General, supra note 149, at 1-2
(same).
261. See S. 75, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(3)-(5) (2011).
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output reduction.262 It would therefore seem that evidence that minimum RPM results in higher prices would support the repudiation
of Leegin or, at least, a strong presumption that minimum RPM
is unreasonable.
Not so fast. In fact, proof that minimum RPM results in prices
that are higher than those in a competitive market is unremarkable
and does not support hostile treatment of minimum RPM, either
globally or in a particular case. Market power entails the ability profitably to reduce output and raise prices above the competitive level,
namely, cost plus a reasonable rate of return.263 Thus, not all practices resulting in higher prices reflect an exercise of such power. For instance, a firm that enhances the quality of its product by investing
additional resources in the production process will incur higher costs
and, if the product is successful, charge higher prices resulting from
enhanced demand. In the same way, a firm that enters a contract
with an expensive advertising firm to develop a new marketing campaign will, if successful, enhance demand and thus price for the
firm’s (now more expensive) product. While both of these practices (if
successful) raise prices, neither necessarily results in prices above
cost. Jaguar did not violate the Sherman Act when it retained Sterling, Cooper, Draper Price.264
Leegin detractors who invoke evidence that minimum RPM results in higher retail prices implicitly assume that the pre-RPM price
is “competitive” and accurately reflects the “costs” of producing and
distributing the manufacturer’s products. Such an approach makes
perfect sense within the price theory paradigm, which assumes away
transaction costs and presumes that all efficiencies are technological
in nature.265 In such a world, efficiencies would necessarily manifest
themselves as reduced production costs and thus lower prices.266
TCE, however, gives us reason to doubt this assumption. TCE asserts
that transaction costs are ubiquitous, with the result that reliance
upon an unfettered market to distribute a product may well result in
a market failure, including dealer free riding.267 If so, the resulting
prices will not be “competitive” in any meaningful sense, but will instead reflect suboptimal costs of promotion, a suboptimal demand for
the manufacturer’s product, and thus a suboptimal equilibrium of
262. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 52 (1911) (detailing harmful
consequences of monopoly as higher prices, reduced output, or reduced quality).
263. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 291-93 (6th Cir. 1898)
(finding that prices exceeding cost plus a normal rate of return were unreasonable), aff’d as
modified by 175 U.S. 211 (1899); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in
Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 937 (1981).
264. See Mad Men: The Other Woman (AMC television broadcast May 27, 2012).
265. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
266. See Meese, supra note 89, at 480-81.
267. See supra Part VI.
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price and output.268 If successful, minimum RPM and/or other methods of counteracting this market failure will result in increased expenditures on promotion, increased demand for the manufacturer’s
product, and thus higher prices. Far from indicating that market
power is afoot, such price effects merely confirm that the manufacturer’s strategy is effective, as reflected in consumers’ enhanced willingness to pay for the product in question.269 As Ronald Coase put it
four decades ago, non-standard practices, while apparently restrictive of competition, are often necessary for “bringing about a
competitive situation.”270
To drive this point home, it is useful to consider the “less restrictive alternatives” that Leegin’s detractors have applauded, such as
non-price restraints and separate contracting for promotional services desired by the manufacturer.271 As explained above, such provisions are often less effective and more costly than minimum RPM.272
Let us assume the contrary, however, that such provisions will result

268. See Meese, supra note 89, at 514-19 (explaining that, where transaction costs and
resulting market failure are present, pre-restraint prices may not reflect “competitive”
equilibrium).
269. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984)
(characterizing product differentiation resulting from horizontal limitation on rivalry as
procompetitive). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of
Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 156 (1984); Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 51, at 147-61
(explaining that proof that an ancillary restraint results in prices higher than the status
quo ante may reflect benefits of the restraint).
Some have claimed that Sylvania’s invocation of “interbrand competition” as an
overriding concern of antitrust law was novel. See Harbour Testimony 2009, supra note
149, at 7 (asserting that Sylvania’s endorsement of interbrand competition was a “bald
proposition”); Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands, Competition, and the Law, 2011
BYU L. REV. 1425, 1486 (characterizing this invocation as “unsupported”). To be sure, Sylvania cited no authority for this proposition. However, antitrust courts have recognized the
overriding importance of interbrand competition since the late 1890s. For instance, covenants ancillary to the formation of a partnership often prevent partners from engaging in
(intrabrand) competition with the partnership. However, in Addyston Pipe, William Howard Taft opined such restraints “were to be encouraged,” because they forced partners to
devote their undivided efforts to enhancing the business of the partnership, which, of
course, furthered what modern courts would call interbrand competition. United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d as modified by 175 U.S. 211
(1899). See also Bork, Price Fixing, supra note 77, at 380-83 (explaining Taft’s reasoning in
transaction cost terms). Indeed, as explained previously, even Schwinn invoked the importance of interbrand competition, when holding that non-price vertical restraints included in consignment agreements could be reasonable. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365, 381-82 (1967).
Another scholar, who endorses Sylvania, nonetheless claims that intrabrand restraints may reduce interbrand competition by “creat[ing] incentives for dealers to push a
product regardless of its underlying merits” and causing dealers to “resort to image appeals
that have nothing to do with a product's merits.” See Grimes, supra note 223, at 472. However, this concern does not seem to justify a distinction between price and non-price restraints, both of which can encourage such conduct by dealers.
270. See Coase, supra note 70, at 67-68.
271. See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text.
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in optimal promotion. If effective, such promotion will, like the promotion induced by minimum RPM, increase each individual dealer’s
costs and also enhance demand for the manufacturer’s product. The
result will be higher retail prices, as some of Leegin’s detractors have
admitted.273 And yet, so far as this author is aware, none of Leegin’s
detractors would ban all non-price vertical restraints or all contracts
that specify a dealer’s promotional duties. While such agreements result in higher prices, such increases are equally consistent with a
beneficial explanation of the restraint, as Leegin itself recognized.274
As a result, proof that minimum RPM results in prices that are
higher than the status quo ante does not establish or suggest that the
practice is predominantly anticompetitive and thus properly subject
to per se condemnation or even hostile rule of reason treatment. After
all, agreements are only per se unlawful if courts can be confident
that rule of reason scrutiny will always or almost always condemn
them.275 Such proof, therefore, would not by itself give rise to a prima
facie case under the rule of reason.276 Thus, even proof that all such
restraints result in higher prices than would prevail in an atomistic
market does not provide confidence that the rule of reason would
condemn such agreements.
Arguments to the contrary seem to conflate the absence of falsification of a theory with confirmation of that theory. Yes, proof that
minimum RPM results in higher prices is consistent with an anticompetitive account of such agreements. However, such proof is just
as consistent with TCE’s presumption that such agreements are procompetitive.277 In both cases “consistency” merely denotes the absence
of falsification, that is, the failure to refute the proposed theory.278
Such a lack of falsification—consistency with observed data—merely

273. See, e.g., Grimes, supra note 223, at 484 (noting, in passing, that alternatives can
also increase prices as much as a challenged restraint). Some Leegin detractors contend
that minimum RPM can reduce the overall welfare of consumers because some consumers
do not value the resulting promotion for which they nonetheless pay a higher price. See
Kirkwood, supra note 155, at 437-38. However, one can level the same critique against any
practice that induces additional promotion.
274. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 895-96
(2007). See also Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 51, at 144-61.
275. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
276. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-95
(1986) (holding that evidence that is equally consistent with procompetitive and anticompetitive objectives cannot by itself support an inference of anticompetitive harm); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S 752, 761-64 (1984) (same); First Nat’l Bank of
Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 270 (1968) (same). See also Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992) (stating that legal presumptions
employed in antitrust litigation should rest on actual market realities and not implausible
economic theories).
277. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text (discussing TCE’s presumption that
non-standard agreements are beneficial).
278. See POPPER, supra note 198, at 265-66.
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saves the theory from oblivion. It does not “prove” it.279 Thus, Leegin’s
proponents may just as well invoke the very same evidence
to “establish” a case that minimum RPM is generally or even
always procompetitive.
There is, however, one sort of evidence that could perhaps falsify
one of these hypotheses, namely, proof of minimum RPM’s impact on
output.280 After all, the exercise of market power reduces output below the competitive level and results in above-cost pricing. If, by contrast, minimum RPM induces effective promotion of the manufacturer’s product, demand for the product will rise, thereby inducing
increased output. However, none of Leegin’s detractors has offered
evidence that, say, adoption of the fair trade laws resulted in reduced
output in states in which defendants practiced minimum RPM, focusing instead upon the propensity of minimum RPM to raise prices
above the atomistic level. In so doing, they have clung to price theory
and rejected TCE, which established that price increases are equally
consistent with a beneficial account of such restraints.
E. Minimum RPM Is Not an “Inherently Suspect” Practice that
Merits a “Quick Look” Analysis
Ordinarily, rejection of per se condemnation results in scrutiny
under a full-blown rule of reason.281 Under this test, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that a restraint produces anticompetitive harm to establish a prima facie case.282 Failure to establish such harm entitles the
defendant to judgment.283 If the plaintiff establishes such harm, the
burden shifts to the defendant to produce evidence that the restraint
produces the sort of “redeeming virtue[s]” the defendant identified
when avoiding per se condemnation.284
Very rarely, however, courts employ a “quick look” rule of reason.285 Under this approach, the mere existence of a restraint deemed

279. Id. at 266 (“But compatibility alone [with data] must not make us attribute to the
theory a positive degree of corroboration: the mere fact that a theory has not yet been falsified can obviously not be regarded as sufficient.”).
280. Cf. Lambert, supra note 148, at 1941-42 (contending that proof that minimum
RPM reduced output should establish prima facie case against it under a “structured rule
of reason”).
281. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977) (endorsing
fact-intensive rule of reason scrutiny for non-price vertical restraints).
282. See, e.g., Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 827 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Applying
the rule of reason, we first look to see ‘whether [the plaintiff] has demonstrated “actual
detrimental effects” or “the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition” [via proof
of market power].’ ”).
283. See, e.g., E & L Consulting, Ltd. v. Doman Indus. Ltd., 472 F.3d 23, 28-29 & n.3
(2d Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of Section 1 complaint because plaintiff did not allege
market-wide harm).
284. See Realcomp II, 635 F.3d at 825-26.
285. See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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“inherently suspect” establishes a prima facie case, casting upon the
defendant a burden of producing evidence that the restraint creates
benefits.286 Failure to discharge this burden dooms the restraint.287
Moreover, even if the defendant does adduce such evidence, the
plaintiff can still prevail by showing that a less restrictive alternative
would have produced the same benefits.288
After Leegin, both scholars and enforcement officials articulated a
structured rule of reason applicable to vertical restraints.289 Under
one such approach, for instance, plaintiffs challenging minimum
RPM would bear the initial burden of proving that the challenged restraint resulted in reduced output or, in the alternative, that structural market conditions are such that minimum RPM can reduce
economic welfare by, for instance, facilitating a cartel between manufacturers.290 Consistent with both TCE and language in Leegin, such
approaches require plaintiffs to do more than simply prove that minimum RPM resulted in higher prices than the status quo ante.291
However, numerous scholars, one think tank, and twenty-seven
states have argued that, despite Leegin, minimum RPM is “inherently suspect” and thus deserves “quick look” analysis.292 There are two
mutually reinforcing flavors of this argument. First, some offer this
approach as a faithful implementation of Leegin itself. These scholars
claim that full-blown rule of reason scrutiny will almost never result
in condemnation of such restraints, contrary to Leegin’s assumption
that such restraints sometimes result in harm.293 Second, some also
286. Id. at 35-37.
287. Id.
288. See Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 675-76 (7th Cir. 1992)
(condemning price restraint under “quick look” analysis because the defendants could have
achieved the same benefits by means of a less restrictive alternative).
289. See Lambert, supra note 148, passim (reviewing various possible approaches to
rule of reason scrutiny of minimum RPM and offering an alternative structured approach);
Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks as
Prepared for the National Association of Attorneys General: Antitrust Federalism: Enhancing Federal/State Cooperation 7-15 (Oct. 7, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/speeches/250635.pdf (articulating post-Leegin structured rule of reason analysis).
290. See, e.g., Lambert, supra note 148, at 1997-2001.
291. Id. at 1971-72. See also Leegin Creative Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,
895-96 (2007) (stating that pricing effects alone do not establish anticompetitive effect).
292. See Amended States’ Comments Urging Denial of Nine West’s Petition, supra note
230, at 9; Petition of Nine West Footwear Corp. to Reopen and Modify Order at 2-4, In re
Nine W. Grp., Inc., No. C-3937 (F.T.C. Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://ftc.gov/
os/comments/ninewestgrp/071206aai.pdf (letter by the American Antitrust Institute urging
the FTC to deny Nine West Group’s Petition to Reopen and Modify Order); Grimes, supra
note 223, at 492-94; Kirkwood, supra note 155, at 423; Lao, supra note 164, at 84-85; Pitofsky, supra note 183, at 65 (endorsing a “quick look” approach to minimum RPM as a “compromise” between per se condemnation and full-blown rule of reason analysis).
293. See Kirkwood, supra note 155, at 423 (advocating a “quick look” with safe harbors
as the best implementation of Leegin’s principles for similar reasons); Lao, supra note 164,
at 84 (“[I]n real-world antitrust litigation, a full-blown rule of reason analysis often operates as a de facto legality rule, which even the Leegin Court did not favor.”). See also Mi-
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argue from first principles that the “quick look” is the optimal methodology for assessing minimum RPM, given the nature of such restraints, their (alleged) probable anticompetitive harm, the sparse
empirical evidence of benefits, and the ready availability of less
restrictive alternatives.294
Neither argument, either alone or in combination, justifies application of the “quick look” to minimum RPM. For one thing, the Leegin
Court was fully aware of the “quick look” option. At least two amicus
briefs advocated such an approach.295 However, while the Court expressly relied on other amicus briefs, it did not mention or otherwise
endorse the “quick look.”296 Moreover, the Court did not stipulate that
the rule of reason as applied to minimum RPM should condemn any
particular proportion of challenged agreements. Assertions to the
contrary are strange, given the admitted paucity of evidence about
the impact of minimum RPM in the real world.297 Instead, the Court
simply stated that there were “risks of unlawful conduct” and that
the “potential anticompetitive consequences of [minimum RPM] must
not be ignored . . . .”298 The Court could not have known how many
firms would in fact adopt harmful minimum RPM despite the deterrent effect of the rule of reason and resulting private and public litigation. Any assertion on this point would have been speculation and
thus dicta at best.
Leegin’s refusal to endorse a “quick look” for minimum RPM is not
surprising as a matter of antitrust principle. Courts have articulated
varying tests for identifying restraints that are inherently suspect,
and minimum RPM does not satisfy any such test. For instance, the
Supreme Court has suggested that a restraint is inherently suspect
when “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have

chael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 827, 827-28 (2009) (reporting that from 1977 to 1999, plaintiffs’ failure to
demonstrate significant anticompetitive effects resulted in dismissal in eighty-four percent
of litigated rule of reason cases, and that this figure increased to ninety-seven percent a
decade later).
294. See Petition of Nine West Footwear Corp. to Reopen and Modify Order, supra note
292, at 2-4; Grimes, supra note 223, at 492-93; Kirkwood, supra note 155, at 463-72. See
also Pitofsky, supra note 183, at 65 (suggesting, before Leegin, that the Supreme Court
adopt a “quick look” approach to minimum RPM if it credits arguments that such contracts
can sometimes reduce free riding).
295. Brief for Anderson Economic Group, LLC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480);
Brief of the American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480) (contending
that minimum RPM should remain unlawful per se but that, in the alternative, courts
should employ a “quick look” approach).
296. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889 (citing three different amicus briefs).
297. See supra notes 275-79 and accompanying text.
298. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 894.
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an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”299 More recently the D.C. Circuit put the test in three alternative ways, stating that
a restraint is inherently suspect if: (1) “it is obvious from the nature
of the challenged conduct that it will likely harm consumers,”300 (2)
“judicial experience and economic learning have shown [such restraints] to be likely to harm consumers,”301 or (3) there is a “close
family resemblance between the suspect practice and another practice that already stands convicted in the court of consumer welfare”
[i.e., is unlawful per se].302
Minimum RPM does not satisfy any such test. For instance, an
observer with “even” a rudimentary knowledge of economics would
presumably understand the basic tenets of TCE, its recognition that
markets sometimes fail, and Telser’s 1960 insight that minimum
RPM can overcome such market failure.303 For similar reasons, one
cannot say that it is “obvious” that minimum RPM will likely harm
consumers. Moreover, as explained earlier, the per se rule has itself
prevented economists from learning about the practice and courts
from gaining judicial experience with it.304 Finally, TCE exploded Dr.
Miles’s assumption that there is a close family resemblance between
minimum RPM and naked horizontal price fixing.305 It is no surprise,
then, that various scholars and enforcement agencies have rejected
“quick look” treatment for minimum RPM.306
To be sure, and as “quick look” proponents point out, a requirement that plaintiffs prove actual anticompetitive harm or conditions
299. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
300. See Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
301. Id. at 36-37.
302. Id. at 37.
303. Indeed, one of Leegin’s detractors has claimed that the “free rider” argument “is
all Economics 101 theory.” Leegin Senate Judiciary Hearing, supra note 149, at 7 (statement of Robert Pitofsky). Some may nonetheless assert that “rudimentary” knowledge excludes TCE, which has supplanted the basic price theory that once encouraged hostile
treatment of non-standard contracts. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text. However, the context suggests otherwise. In particular, the Court’s qualification of the term
“rudimentary” with “even” connotes that anyone, including the most sophisticated economists, would conclude that the challenged practice is harmful. Indeed, after announcing
this standard the Court ruled, after reviewing sophisticated economic literature, that the
challenged horizontal agreements limiting advertising, while normally unlawful per se,
were not inherently suspect. See California Dental, 526 U.S. at 771-73.
304. See supra notes 275-79 and accompanying text.
305. See supra Part VI.
306. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, at 285 n.45 (“[V]ertical nonprice restraints are
never subjected to ‘quick look’ analysis.”); id. at 538-39 (endorsing structured rule of reason
for both price and non-price vertical restraints, imposing upon the plaintiff a burden of
proving harm or circumstances suggesting such harm); Lambert, supra note 148, at 197172. See also Order Granting in Part Petition to Reopen and Modify Order Issued April 11,
2000, In re Nine W. Grp., Inc., No. C-3937 (F.T.C. May 6, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/9810386/080506order.pdf (modifying previous order banning
minimum RPM given the absence of evidence of actual competitive harm); Varney, supra
note 289, at 7-15 (articulating post-Leegin structured rule of reason analysis).
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conducive to such harm will be more burdensome than a presumption
that such harm exists.307 In particular, these proponents contend that
proof that manufacturers possess market power is particularly expensive.308 However, this burden will be no greater than the burden
that antitrust law routinely imposes on plaintiffs in a variety of contexts. For instance, plaintiffs alleging “monopolization” contrary to
Section 2 must prove a relevant market and the defendant’s share of
that market.309 Plaintiffs challenging a merger must prove the relevant market in which the transaction will supposedly lessen competition and prove the market shares of various participants in the industry.310 Plaintiffs contending that a tying contract is unlawful per
se under Section 1 must allege and prove that the defendant has economic power.311 In each instance failure to prove such a market
dooms the plaintiff’s case.312 Plaintiffs do, in fact, sometimes succeed
in proving such markets.313
Proponents of a “quick look” for minimum RPM may respond by
claiming that these practices pose smaller competitive risks than
minimum RPM. This is pure conjecture. As explained earlier, Leegin’s detractors have not established that minimum RPM usually reduces economic welfare. The evidence they have offered—higher prices during the fair trade era—is equally consistent with TCE’s
presumption that the practice overcomes a market failure.314 Indeed,
Leegin’s detractors lack the courage of their convictions. If minimum

307. See, e.g., Kirkwood, supra note 156, at 457-59 (explaining why this requirement is
“[t]he biggest hurdle facing a plaintiff under the full rule of reason” for minimum RPM).
308. Id. at 458-59.
309. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480-81 (1992)
(citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)).
310. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357, 362 (1963).
311. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 461-64.
312. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26-29 (1984) (rejecting
plaintiff’s per se tying claim because the defendant lacked economic power); United States
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394, 404 (1956) (rejecting the government’s proposed market definition and, thus, the claim that the defendant possessed monopoly power sufficient for a Section 2 claim); United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp.
2d 1098, 1161 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (rejecting merger challenge because the plaintiff failed to
prove its proffered relevant product market).
313. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. 451, passim (rejecting defendant’s effort to undermine plaintiff’s proof of market power for Section 2 and tying purposes); Aspen Skiing
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 604-05 (1985) (affirming the jury’s finding that defendant violated Section 2); FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1032
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (affirming injunction against challenged merger after accepting plaintiff’s
proposed market definition); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 44-46 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (per curiam) (holding that Microsoft violated Section 2 by monopolizing the market
for “Intel-based PC Operating Systems”); FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 711 (D.C.
Cir. 2001); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 36-37 (D.D.C. 1998) (granting
plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction preventing proposed merger after embracing
plaintiff’s proposed market definition); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1069
(D.D.C. 1997) (same).
314. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
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RPM really is harmful in a higher proportion of cases than other
practices, presumably plaintiffs, including federal and state enforcers, will be able to make such harm apparent to courts.315 Moreover,
if plaintiffs do prevail in a significant proportion of such cases,
courts, having gained additional experience with minimum RPM, can
depart from the ordinary rule of reason framework at that time.316
However, immediate application of a “quick look” rule of reason
would contravene both TCE and the standards governing which restraints are inherently suspect.
F. Leegin Did Not Contravene Stare Decisis
Several of those who resist Leegin contend that stare decisis required adherence to Dr. Miles, even if the Supreme Court believed
the decision to be incorrect in light of new information.317 In fact, this
assertion appeared in a finding in legislation proposed in 2011.318
These detractors repeat many of the arguments made by Justice
Breyer, who devoted much of his lengthy dissent to criticism of the
majority’s approach to stare decisis.319 Like Justice Breyer, these
scholars and advocates are incorrect.
The invocation of stare decisis by Leegin’s opponents is supremely
ironic contravening, as it does, previous case law that expressly addressed the role of precedent in the antitrust context. For instance, in
State Oil Co. v. Khan, the Court addressed a three-decades-old precedent declaring maximum RPM unlawful per se.320 After determining
that per se condemnation was no longer consistent with sound economic reasoning, the Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice
O’Connor, went on to determine whether the doctrine of stare decisis
315. Cf. Oliver E. Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust, 59 AM.
ECON. REV. 105, 113 (1969) (contending that recognition of relevance of efficiencies in merger analysis will lead parties and enforcement agencies to develop new techniques for ascertaining and measuring such effects).
316. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) (suggesting that experience
derived from thorough rule of reason analyses can convince courts that restraints should be
subject to “quick look” instead).
317. See, e.g., Cavanagh, supra note 183, at 27-28 (arguing that the Leegin Court
“failed to give appropriate weight to . . . stare decisis”); Harbour, supra note 164, at 45
(“The Court should have been very reluctant to change a longstanding rule of law in response to theoretical economic assumptions, especially when these assumptions lack rigorous and valid empirical support.”); Lance McMillian, The Proper Role of Courts: The Mistakes of the Supreme Court In Leegin, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 405, 408. See also Brief of the
American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 5-10, Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480) (contending
that demands of stare decisis are more powerful in the antitrust context than with respect
to other statutes).
318. See S. 75, 112th Cong. §2(a)(5) (2011) (asserting that Leegin “improperly disregarded 96 years of antitrust law precedent”).
319. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 918-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
320. 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997). In Khan, the Court overruled Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S.
145 (1968), which had declared maximum RPM unlawful per se.
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nonetheless compelled adherence to a wealth-destroying rule.321 Justice O’Connor acknowledged that stare decisis generally has greater
force in the statutory context and that Congress, and not the courts,
should revise erroneous interpretations of statutes.322 Still, invoking
several precedents, she explained that stare decisis has less force in
the antitrust context.323 Her reasoning is worth quoting in full:
But “[s]tare decisis is not an inexorable command.” In the area of antitrust law, there is a competing interest, well represented
in this Court’s decisions, in recognizing and adapting to changed
circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience. Thus,
the general presumption that legislative changes should be left to
Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act in light of
the accepted view that Congress “expected the courts to give shape
to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.” As we have explained, the term “restraint of trade,” as used
in §1, also “invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890.”
Accordingly, this Court has reconsidered its decisions construing
the Sherman Act when the theoretical underpinnings of those decisions are called into serious question.324

This unanimous account of antitrust stare decisis, which Justice
Breyer joined at the time, was not novel. Ten years earlier, the Court
had, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, opined that “[t]he Sherman Act
adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’ along with its dynamic potential.
It invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static content
that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890.”325 Ten years
before that, a unanimous opinion by Justice Stevens concluded that
Congress “expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad
mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.”326 Several other decisions, including of course Sylvania, have adjusted or repudiated prior
decisions in light of new understandings about the economic impact
of challenged practices.327 Each of these decisions contradicts asser-

321. See id. at 20-21.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. (citations omitted).
325. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988).
326. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (“Congress,
however, did not intend the text of the Sherman Act to delineate the full meaning of the
statute or its application in concrete situations. The legislative history makes it perfectly
clear that it expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on
common-law tradition. The Rule of Reason, with its origins in common-law precedents long
antedating the Sherman Act, has served that purpose. It has been used to give the Act both
flexibility and definition, and its central principle of antitrust analysis has remained constant.”).
327. See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (rejecting previous decisions holding that possession of a patent confers economic power for purposes of
tying doctrine); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (repu-
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tions by Justice Breyer and others that courts should treat Sherman
Act precedents like other statutory precedents, requiring a particularly strong justification before courts can overrule a prior decision.328
If anything, the case for overruling Dr. Miles was stronger than was
the case for departing from precedent in Khan. After all, TCE did
more than simply call the “theoretical underpinnings” of Dr. Miles into “serious question.”329 Instead, TCE obliterated the central economic premise of Dr. Miles, namely, that vertically-imposed RPM is
equivalent to a horizontal cartel between dealers.330 True respect for
stare decisis includes respect for those decisions that have repeatedly
held that precedent has less force in the Sherman Act context.
Any other approach to stare decisis would contravene Standard
Oil’s century-old construction of the term “restraint of trade.”331 As
the Court explained, Congress did not invent the term “restraint of
trade,” but instead took the term from the common law.332 Moreover,
the term “restraint of trade” as employed at common law did not refer to a particular, unchanging list of agreements, but instead referred to agreements that courts believed produced particular consequences.333 Thus, agreements that were unenforceable during the
fifteenth century because courts believed them to be harmful became
enforceable in the early eighteenth century as judges revised their
understandings of their consequences.334 As the Supreme Court explained one year before the Sherman Act, an earlier rule defining
“restraint of trade” “was made under a condition of things, and a
state of society, different from those which now prevail [and] the rule

diating doctrine of intra-enterprise conspiracy contained in prior decisions); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26-29 (1984) (rejecting the prior approach to defining “economic power” for purposes of tying doctrine); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (rejecting a per se ban on non-price vertical restraints); FTC v.
Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966) (repudiating a 1920 decision articulating the meaning
of “unfair competition” under the Federal Trade Commission Act).
328. Justice Breyer attempted to distinguish Khan on the ground that the decision that
it overruled was a mere twenty-nine years old, “nowhere close to the century Dr. Miles has
stood.” See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 927 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Putting aside the fact that more than forty states accepted Congress’s invitation to reject Dr. Miles during the fair trade era, the longevity of a precedent
does not immunize it from subsequent theoretical developments. After all, the outright ban
on trade restraints, first announced in the fifteenth century, survived for three centuries,
only to be overruled by judicial fiat. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
329. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 21 (1997).
330. See supra notes 130-38, 141, 145 and accompanying text.
331. See 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911). See also Meese, supra note 13, at 786-87 (explaining
that modern jurists and scholars uniformly embrace Standard Oil).
332. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 50-51.
333. Id. at 58-59.
334. Id. at 51, 56-59 (describing this evolution with approval); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280-81 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d as modified by 175 U.S. 211
(1899).
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laid down is not regarded as inflexible, and has been considerably modified.”335 Several nineteenth-century state court opinions concurred.336
Standard Oil described this dynamic, common law approach with
approval when articulating the meaning of the statute.337 Like the
common law, the Court said, the term “restraint of trade” did not
freeze into place the list of agreements deemed unenforceable in
1890.338 Instead, the term empowered courts to ban all contracts, including those unknown in 1890, that offended the public policy contained in the Act because they “produce[d] the consequences of monopoly.”339 To determine whether a challenged arrangement had the
prohibited effect, the Court said, judges should apply their “reason.”340 Thus, as Robert Bork explained over four decades ago, “[t]he
rules implied by the policy [that animates the rule of reason] are alterable as economic analysis progresses.”341 Finally, as explained earlier, Standard Oil approved the common law practice of altering doctrine in light of “more accurate economic conceptions . . . .”342
To pile irony on top of irony, Dr. Miles itself embraced a dynamic
approach to the term “restraint of trade.” After all, at common law,
minimum RPM was not automatically unlawful or unenforceable. Indeed, just one year before Congress passed the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court, in Fowle v. Park, a case premised upon diversity of citizenship, enforced as reasonable an agreement setting minimum
resale prices of patent medicine.343 William Howard Taft would cite
this opinion with approval in his monumental Addyston Pipe decision, describing the challenged agreement as “ancillary to the main
and lawful purpose of the contract, and . . . necessary to the protection of the covenantee in the carrying out of that main purpose.”344
Moreover, some state courts enforced minimum RPM agreements af-

335. See Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889).
336. See, e.g., Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 421-22 (N.Y. 1887) (endorsing modification of the common law of trade restraints in light of changed circumstances);
Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522, 525 (Mo. Ct. App. 1880) (“It is not that contracts in restraint of trade are any more legal or enforceable now than they were at any
former period, but that the courts look differently at the question as to what is a restraint
of trade.”); Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pin. 123, 139-41 (Wis. 1851) (same).
337. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 51-59.
338. Id. at 58-59; Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act,
9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 47-48 (1966).
339. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 55-57, 64.
340. Id. at 63-64 (stating that courts should employ “the light of reason” to determine
whether a challenged agreement offends the “public policy embodied in the statute”).
341. See Bork, supra note 338, at 47-48.
342. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 55; see id. at 59.
343. 131 U.S. 88 (1889).
344. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d as
modified by 175 U.S. 211 (1899).

966

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:907

ter passage of the Sherman Act and before Dr. Miles, sometimes relying upon Fowle.345
Perhaps Standard Oil, Dr. Miles, and various more recent decisions embraced an incorrect approach to stare decisis. 346 Perhaps the
1890 Congress that passed the Sherman Act expected that courts
would simply adhere to their own precedents indefinitely, no matter
how much subsequent learning and doctrinal developments undermined the factual premises of such decisions. However, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly taken a different approach. One cannot invoke
stare decisis as a rationale for steadfast adherence to Dr. Miles, no
matter how wrong, while simultaneously abandoning numerous other precedents that require the Court to jettison decisions whose factual premises have proven false.
X. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: WHY RESISTANCE IS BOTH
MISGUIDED AND FUTILE
The rule of reason requires courts to discern whether challenged
conduct will produce monopoly or its consequences. Courts performing this role must rely upon what Standard Oil called “accurate economic conceptions” when articulating antitrust doctrine.347 An antitrust regime that ignored theoretical developments would not be
based on “reason.”
Dr. Miles and subsequent bans on non-price restraints rested upon the best theory courts could muster, theory that equated vertical
restraints on dealers with analogous naked horizontal agreements
between dealers. TCE, however, exploded this assumption, demonstrating that vertical restraints can reduce the cost of transacting by
minimizing market failures. Leegin’s detractors have failed to offer a
convincing alternative rationale for a per se ban on minimum RPM.
Instead, these detractors have advanced arguments that question
TCE, basic antitrust principles, or both.
Nothing prevents Congress or the states from ignoring advances
in economic learning and banning conduct that often creates wealth.
The rule of reason binds federal courts, not Congress or the states.
However, restoration of Dr. Miles would not be a “correction” of Leegin. To be sure, reimposition of Dr. Miles would make some markets

345. See, e.g., Grogan v. Chafee, 105 P. 745, 747 (Cal. 1909) (invoking Fowle); Garst v.
Harris, 58 N.E. 174, 174 (Mass. 1900) (same); John D. Park & Sons v. Nat’l Wholesale
Druggists’ Ass’n, 67 N.E. 136, 141 (N.Y. 1903) (Parker, C.J., concurring) (same). See also
Garst v. Charles, 72 N.E. 839, 840 (Mass. 1905) (enforcing such an agreement without invoking Fowle).
346. See supra note 327 and accompanying text (detailing various decisions holding
that courts may reverse prior decisions in light of changed economic understandings).
347. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 54.
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appear more “competitive.” 348 However, competition for its own sake
has never been the objective of the Sherman Act; some limitations on
rivalry improve market outcomes and thus economic welfare.349 Reimposition of Dr. Miles would create antitrust doctrine divorced from
the very economic theory that Congress expected courts to apply in
fashioning antitrust doctrine. At the same time, it seems unlikely
that reimposition of a per se ban on minimum RPM would induce the
Supreme Court to abandon decisions like Sylvania and its progeny.
The result would therefore be an arbitrary distinction between price
and non-price restraints, encouraging parties to elect non-price restraints for reasons unrelated to wealth creation.
Thus, such a restoration of Dr. Miles would operate as an exemption from basic antitrust principles, preventing firms from adopting
ordinary competitive practices that improve the competitive process.
Like other antitrust exemptions, the resulting rule would potentially
advantage some rent-seeking participants in the legislative process,
particularly no-frills retailers and manufacturers with established
brands, at the expense of others, such as smaller, innovative manufacturers hoping to break into the market by inducing established
dealers to stock their products. 350 Perhaps the closest analogy to such
an exemption can be found in the Robinson-Patman Act, which, as
explained earlier, deterred large, efficient chains from obtaining volume discounts that could ultimately benefit consumers. 351
In any event, state or Congressional nullification of Leegin will not
be the “last word” on minimum RPM. Statutory exemptions from the
Sherman Act are read narrowly, “with beady eyes and green eyeshades,” to minimize the impact of special interest influence in the
legislative process. 352 Proponents of “reason” will still have many
348. Cf. S. 75, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(4) (2011) (finding that Leegin “substantially harms
the ability of [some discounters] to compete”).
349. See supra notes 265-70 and accompanying text.
350. See Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 51, at 165-66 (contending that availability
of effective promotional strategies can enhance incentives to innovate). Cf. S. 75, 112th
Cong. § 2(a)(4) (2011) (finding that repeal of Leegin will advantage discounters). See also
supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text (explaining how minimum RPM can facilitate
entry by upstart manufacturers).
351. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 156, at 312 (The Report
treated the Robinson-Patman Act as an exception to free market competition because “[t]he
Act is fundamentally inconsistent with the antitrust laws and harms consumer welfare. It
is not possible to reconcile the provisions of the Act with the purpose of antitrust law.”). See
also Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEX. L. REV. 705, 711
(1982) (“The Robinson-Patman Act is a small-business protection statute . . . .”).
352. See Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 671-72 (7th Cir. 1992)
(“Special interest laws do not have ‘spirits,’ and it is inappropriate to extend them to
achieve more of the objective [than] the lobbyists wanted. . . . Recognition that special interest legislation enshrines results rather than principles is why courts read exceptions to
the antitrust laws narrowly, with beady eyes and green eyeshades.”). See also Union Labor
Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126 (1982) (“[E]xemptions from the antitrust laws
must be construed narrowly.”).
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weapons at their disposal to mitigate the harmful impact of any codification of Dr. Miles.
For instance, federal enforcement agencies, which once simply declined to enforce the Robinson-Patman Act, may decline to challenge
reasonable instances of minimum RPM, thereby replicating Leegin as
a matter of enforcement policy. 353 While private parties could still invoke a revitalized Dr. Miles, courts could minimize the impact of such
“private attorneys general.” In particular, courts could invoke the
doctrine of in pari delicto, which prevents parties from challenging
an agreement they have voluntarily entered. 354 While the Court
waived this doctrine in the dealer-supplier context during the inhospitality era by claiming that such agreements are involuntary,355
TCE demonstrates that such agreements can be voluntary efforts to
minimize transaction costs. 356 Moreover, even if such suits proceed,
plaintiffs would not be home free; the doctrine of antitrust injury limits private recoveries to those damages that flow from the anticompetitive impact, if any, of the challenged restraint. 357 Thus, a terminated dealer could not, for instance, recover profits lost because
minimum RPM prevented it from free riding on the promotional efforts of other dealers, given that the prevention of free riding is not a
harmful impact of minimum RPM. 358 As a result, even if Congress
codifies the per se rule, courts can bar private challenges to efficient
minimum RPM by finding that such agreements are voluntary or, in
the alternative, limit the damages that aggrieved dealers can recover. 359 State courts could invoke similar reasoning to block private
suits under their own antitrust statutes.
What, though, about the merits of such litigation? Armed with the
authority to read exemptions narrowly, courts can minimize the impact of a legislative ban on minimum RPM in a number of ways.
First, courts can read the agency and consignment exceptions to the
per se rule broadly, allowing firms to circumvent any per se ban by
altering the form of the transaction between manufacturer and deal-

353. See Easterbrook, supra note 351, at 710-11 (approving the Carter Administration’s
refusal to enforce the Robinson-Patman Act).
354. See Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825, 829 (7th Cir. 1995) (invoking the doctrine
to bar a challenge to a contract to which the plaintiff was a party).
355. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 140-41 (1968).
356. See Meese, supra note 88 (explaining how TCE implies that parties enter efficient
non-standard contracts voluntarily).
357. See generally Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petrol. Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990) (holding
that a dealer challenging maximum RPM imposed on rivals could not recover damages resulting from above-cost and thus procompetitive pricing).
358. See id. at 335-40; Isaksen v. Vt. Castings, Inc., 825 F.2d 1158, 1165 (7th Cir. 1987)
(holding that terminated dealer could not recover profits it expected to derive from free riding off the efforts of full service retailers).
359. See Blackburn, 53 F.3d at 829-30 (holding that the doctrine of in pari delicto
barred suit when both sides were equally responsible for the restraint).
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er. 360 Moreover, courts can strengthen the Colgate exception, refusing
to condemn agreements absent an explicit agreement between manufacturer and dealer. 361 Finally, courts can read any such legislation so
as not to penalize an agreement between a manufacturer and one
dealer to terminate another, price-cutting dealer. 362
To be sure, state courts are not bound to employ “reason.” Moreover, such courts do not “internalize” the full impact of doctrine they
generate, which, like commerce itself, may stretch across state
lines.363 Thus, these tribunals may be less willing to adopt the sort of
doctrinal strategies necessary to minimize the impact of a (statelevel) ban on minimum RPM. Nonetheless, states that adopt such
wealth-destroying rules will do so at their own peril. For one thing,
manufacturers can avoid the impact of a state ban on minimum RPM
by terminating dealers in the state and integrating forward into distribution or simply withdrawing from the jurisdiction altogether.364
Moreover, such a ban could deprive a state’s citizens of the benefits of
additional interbrand competition in those industries where minimum RPM is necessary to induce entry-facilitating promotion. 365 Finally, airtight bans on minimum RPM may simply force manufacturers to employ more costly alternative means of inducing promotion,
thereby increasing consumer prices.366 Indeed, these considerations
may explain why more state legislatures have not responded to Leegin and why one state legislature recently rejected its own supreme
court’s effort to ban minimum RPM. 367

360. See, e.g., Ill. Corporate Travel, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 889 F.2d 751 (7th Cir.
1989) (finding that the airline’s price fixing agreement with travel agent did not offend Dr.
Miles). But see Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430 (7th Cir. 1986) (opining that
sham agency agreements designed solely to circumvent Dr. Miles were void).
361. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
362. See generally Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (holding
that such agreements are properly analyzed under a full-blown rule of reason).
363. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 231-32 (1899) (finding that the Sherman Act reached multistate cartel agreements because, absent federal
regulation, each state might adopt rules that served “its own particular interest”).
364. See Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying
Contracts, 28 J.L. & ECON. 345, 356 n.39 (1985) (reporting termination of all 642 Jack-inthe-Box franchisees after a class action settlement prohibited the use of quality control tying contracts). Cf. William J. Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate
Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 311-15 (1997) (explaining how a state that imposes onerous law on foreign corporations may drive investment from the jurisdiction).
365. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text (explaining how minimum RPM
can facilitate new entry).
366. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 902 (2007).
367. See PLC Antitrust, Kansas Law Reverses Kansas Supreme Court Decision on Resale Price Maintenance, PRACTICAL LAW CO. (Apr. 19, 2013), http://us.practicallaw.com/2525-9093. For a summary of the legislation, see Kansas Restraint of Trade Act—
Harmonization; Reasonable Restraints; Exceptions; Damages; SB 124, KAN. LEGIS.
RESEARCH DEP’T., http://www.kslegislature.org/li/b2013_14/measures/documents/summary
_sb_124_2013.pdf.
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In short, a per se ban on minimum RPM would contravene the
very economic theory that Congress expected courts to apply when
fashioning antitrust doctrine. While legislatures are free to impose
such rules, they should not be surprised if enforcers and courts seek
to minimize the harm from such a departure from “reason.” Resistance to Leegin may thus be more than misguided. It may also
be futile.

